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Copyright and the Harvard Open Access Mandate 
By Eric Priest* 
ABSTRACT 
 Open access proponents argue that scholars are far more likely to make their 
articles freely available online if they are required to do so by their university or funding 
institution. Therefore, if the open access movement is to achieve anything close to its 
goal of seeing all scholarly articles freely available online, mandates will likely play a 
significant role. In 2008, the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences adopted a 
policy that purports not only to require scholars to deposit their works in open access 
repositories, but also to grant the university nonexclusive copyright licenses to archive 
and publicly distribute all faculty-produced scholarly articles. A number of other 
American universities have since adopted similar policies. The principal aim of this 
Article is to analyze the legal effect of these Harvard-style open access “permission” 
mandates. 
 By invoking copyright law terminology in permission mandates, schools might 
intend that they have the legal effect of transferring nonexclusive rights to the school, 
thereby clarifying and fortifying the school’s rights to reproduce and publicly disseminate 
faculty works. However, the legal effect of these mandates is uncertain for several 
reasons. First, it is unsettled whether scholars or their university employers are the 
authors and initial owners of scholarly articles under U.S. copyright law’s work-made-
for-hire rules, which vest authorship and copyright ownership in the employer for works 
created by employees within the scope of employment. Second, the mandates are broad 
university policies that purport to grant the university nonexclusive copyright licenses in 
every scholarly article unless a faculty member affirmatively opts out on a per-article 
basis. Are the policies specific enough to provide the essential terms of the grant? 
Furthermore, can the mere adoption of a school policy, without some additional 
affirmative act by the author, effectuate such a grant without unduly encroaching upon 
the author’s autonomy interests? Lastly, even if the policies effectuate nonexclusive 
license grants, will the licenses survive after the author transfers copyright ownership to a 
journal publisher as per common practice? Section 205(e) of the Copyright Act provides 
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that a prior nonexclusive license evidenced in a writing signed by the right holder 
prevails over a subsequent conflicting transfer of copyright ownership, so the answer 
appears to turn on whether permission mandates satisfy the requirements of § 205(e). 
 This Article argues that permission mandates can create legally enforceable, 
durable nonexclusive licenses. First, it argues that although there are important 
justifications, including academic freedom concerns, for recognizing the controversial 
“teacher exception” to the work for hire rules for scholarly articles, such an exception 
may be unnecessary because a strong argument also exists that much scholarship is 
produced outside the scope of employment for work for hire purposes. Second, it argues 
that permission mandates provide sufficient evidence of the grantor’s intent and the rights 
granted to create effective nonexclusive licenses. Third, permission mandates satisfy the 
requirements of § 205(e) and establish the license’s priority over the subsequent transfer 
of copyright ownership largely because they fulfill the underlying purposes of § 205(e) 
by providing sufficient evidence and notice of the license to potential copyright 
transferees (typically academic publishers). In reaching these conclusions, this Article 
emphasizes that Courts should consider the uniformity costs (social costs resulting from 
applying uniform rules and granting uniform entitlements across diverse conditions) that 
arise from applying to scholarly articles copyright rules developed to address proprietary 
models of information production. Applying the relevant copyright rules in a manner 
sensitive to the nonmarket nature of scholarly production is the most effective way to 
reduce these social costs, and reinforces the conclusion that mandate licenses are 
enforceable. 
 Lastly, the Article considers whether the opt-out nature of permission mandates 
offends notions of authorial autonomy in copyright. It compares permission mandates 
with another high profile opt-out licensing regime: the proposed Google Books 
settlement agreement, which the court rejected partly because of authorial autonomy 
concerns. However, authorial autonomy is far less of a concern for scholarly articles than 
for the books at issue in the Google Books case, due to the nonmarket nature of scholarly 
article production coupled with academic community norms. Accordingly, it does not 
substantially interfere with authors’ autonomy interests to find that the opt-out structure 
of permission mandates creates valid nonexclusive licenses in universities. 
  
Vol. 10:7] Eric Priest 
 379 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 381 
II. Scholarly Publishing and the Movement for Open Access Scholarship ................. 385 
A. The Scholarly Journal Publishing Market ........................................................ 385 
1. The Roots of the Serials Crisis ........................................................... 385 
2. Peer-Review and the Scholarly Article Production Process .............. 388 
B. The Open Access Movement ............................................................................ 390 
1. The Rise of the Movement ................................................................. 390 
2. “Open Access” Does Not Equal “No Copyright” .............................. 390 
3. Two Forms of Open Access: Open Access Journals Versus Self-
Archiving Scholarship Online ............................................................ 391 
4. The Emergence of Open Access Mandates ........................................ 394 
III. The Interrelationship Between Copyright, Scholarship, and Open 
Access ...................................................................................................................... 398 
A. Utilitarian Theory, Nonmarket Information Production, and  
Uniformity Costs .............................................................................................. 398 
B. Initial Ownership: The Effect of Copyright’s Work Made for Hire  Rules  
on Scholarship .................................................................................................. 400 
1. Applying the Work Made for Hire Doctrine to Scholarship .............. 401 
2. The Enigmatic “Teacher Exception” to the Work Made for Hire 
Doctrine .............................................................................................. 403 
3. The Effect of University Copyright Policies on Initial Ownership.... 408 
4. Copyright Ownership and Academic Freedom .................................. 411 
C. Priority of Nonexclusive Licenses over Conflicting Transfers of Copyright 
Ownership ......................................................................................................... 418 
IV. Evaluating the Legal Effect of Permission Mandates:  A Context-
Sensitive Approach .................................................................................................. 423 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 380
A. Do Permission Mandates Grant Universities Durable Nonexclusive 
Licenses? .......................................................................................................... 423 
1. Do Permission Mandates Effectuate Nonexclusive License 
Grants? ............................................................................................... 425 
2. Do Permission Mandates Satisfy § 205(e)’s Writing 
Requirement? ..................................................................................... 427 
B. Taking into Account the Nonmarket Context of Scholarly Production ........... 430 
1. Permission Mandates and Authorial Autonomy ................................ 430 
2. Reducing Open Access-Related Uniformity Costs Through 
Judicial Tailoring ............................................................................... 435 
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 438 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 440 
 
  





¶1  On February 12, 2008, the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences 
unanimously approved a policy requiring every faculty member to make all of their 
future scholarly articles freely available to the world online.
1
  The vote was hailed as a 
watershed
2
 for the open access movement, that is, the movement to increase social 
welfare by making scholarship publicly available online free of cost and access 
restrictions.
3
  This was not the first university policy mandating that faculty make their 
works open access, but it was the first at an American university, and adoption by an 
institution of Harvard’s stature was sure to raise awareness and inspire other universities 
to do the same.
4
  Indeed, in the three years since the Harvard vote, nearly thirty U.S. 
universities and academic departments have adopted similar mandates, including 




¶2  The Harvard mandate also marked a watershed for its key contribution to the open 
access movement.  Whereas previous university mandates only required faculty to 
deposit their own scholarly articles online, the Harvard mandate purports to automatically 
grant the school a nonexclusive license to archive and distribute every scholarly article 
produced by its faculty unless a faculty member expressly opts out on a per-article basis.
6
  
Mandates are viewed by some as critical to the success of the open access movement 
because without mandates, a relatively low percentage of scholars (about fifteen to 
twenty percent) make some version of their articles freely available online.
7
  With 
mandates in place, however, research suggests that nearly all scholars would agree to 
permit their articles to be freely distributed online, the vast majority willingly.
8
 
¶3  In the university setting, the Harvard-style “permission mandate” is a far more 
powerful open access tool, with the potential to be more disruptive, than its “deposit 
mandate” cousin.  First, and most importantly, a permission mandate resets the default in 
 
1
 See Harvard University Unanimously Votes ‘Yes’ for Open Access, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET 
& SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2008), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/3927. 
2
 See Peter Suber, The Open Access Mandate at Harvard, SPARC OPEN ACCESS NEWSLETTER, no. 119, 
Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/03-02-08.htm; PHILIP YOUNG, THE SERIALS 
CRISIS AND OPEN ACCESS: A WHITE PAPER FOR THE VIRGINIA TECH COMMISSION ON RESEARCH 9 (2009), 
available at http://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/11317/OAwhitepaper.pdf. 
3
 See Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, BUDAPEST OPEN ACCESS INITIATIVE (Feb. 14, 2002), 
http://www.soros.org/openaccess/read.shtml (defining open access). 
4
 See Suber, supra note 2; YOUNG, supra note 2, at 9. 
5
 See ROARMAP: REGISTRY OF OPEN ACCESS REPOSITORIES MANDATORY ARCHIVING POLICIES, 
http://roarmap.eprints.org/ (last visited June 3, 2012) [hereinafter ROARMAP] (listing twenty-eight higher 
education or research institutions in the United States that at the time of this writing have adopted 
permission-style mandates). 
6
 See Suber, supra note 2.  
7
 Yassine Gargouri et al., Self-Selected or Mandated, Open Access Increases Citation Impact for Higher 
Quality Research, PLOS ONE, Oct. 18, 2010, 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0013636. 
8
 Alma Swan, The Culture of Open Access: Researchers’ Views and Responses, in OPEN ACCESS: KEY 
STRATEGIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 65, 69–70 (Neil Jacobs ed., 2006). 





  Rights of exclusion are the core of copyright:  copying, distributing, or 
making some other privileged use of another’s work is infringement absent the author’s 
permission.
10
  The mandate seemingly turns this exclusive right on its head by 
automatically granting broad permissions absent the author’s written objection.11  
Second, a permission mandate empowers the university to proactively post an article 
online in the event that the faculty author does not.  This ensures that the university need 
not wait on faculty in order to achieve online dissemination of nearly all of the school’s 
scholarly article output.  Third, the permission mandate enables retention of rights by 
vesting rights in the school that it can later grant back to the author after she has 
transferred copyright ownership to a journal according to common practice in the 
scholarly publishing industry.
12
  This way, the author need not seek the publisher’s 




¶4  The advent of permission mandates ups the ante in the escalating tensions between 
universities and academic journal publishers over open access.  Publishers worry that as 
more scholarship becomes available online for free, university libraries will have less 
incentive to purchase journal subscriptions.
14
  Open access proponents, by contrast, argue 
that academic journal prices have become excessive in many cases, while publishers—
many of which are commercial—enjoy sizable profits.15  Open access proponents further 
contend that the Internet has changed the economics of scholarly publishing:  now that 
producers can make scholarship freely available online at relatively low cost, there is less 
need to distribute it through subscription-access-only journals.
16
  They argue that open 
access produces the dual benefit of relieving university libraries of high scholarly 
periodical prices while providing the public with free access to scholarship.
17
  Open 
access proponents acknowledge the importance of the article peer review process, 
 
9
 See Stuart Shieber, University Open-Access Policies as Mandates, OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET (June 30, 
2009), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/pamphlet/2009/06/30/university-open-access-policies-as-mandates/. 
10
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011). 
11
 Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences Open Access Policy, HARV. U. LIBR. OFF. FOR SCHOLARLY 
COMM. (Feb. 12, 2008), http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/hfaspolicy [hereinafter Harvard FAS Mandate]; see 
infra Appendix, p. 440. 
12
 Stuart M. Shieber, A Model Open-Access Policy, HARV. U. LIBR. OFF. FOR SCHOLARLY COMM. 2 
(2010), http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/model-policy-annotated_0.pdf. 
13
 Because the nonexclusive licenses that arise from Harvard-style permission mandates permit non-
profit uses only, subsequent use of the article in a book sold for profit might exceed the scope of the 
license.  
14
 Karen M. Albert, Open Access: Implications for Scholarly Publishing and Medical Libraries, 94 J. 
MED. LIBR. ASS’N 253, 256–57 (2006). 
15
 See Adam Stevenson, The Economic Case for Open Access in Academic Publishing, ARS TECHNICA 
(Nov. 29, 2010, 6:25 AM), http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/11/the-economic-case-for-open-
access-in-academic-publishing.ars. 
16
 Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, PETER SUBER AT EARLHAM C. (June 21, 2004), 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (“[T]he purpose of [open access] is not to punish or 
undermine expensive journals, but to provide an accessible alternative and take full advantage of new 
technology—the internet—for widening distribution and reducing costs.”). 
17
 See Why Librarians Should Be Concerned with Open Access, OPEN ACCESS SCHOLARLY INFO. 
SOURCEBOOK, 
http://www.openoasis.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&Itemid=256 (last 
updated June 26, 2009); The Public’s Right to Research, OPEN ACCESS SCHOLARLY INFO. SOURCEBOOK, 
http://www.openoasis.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=547&Itemid=265 (last 
updated June 8, 2009). 
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currently superintended by journals,
18
 and that there are substantial costs to publishing 
scholarship.
19
  The goal of open access, they argue, is not to supplant peer review or seek 
a cost-free publication model; rather, it is to ensure that all peer-reviewed scholarship is 
publicly accessible at no cost to the user.
20
 
¶5  By invoking copyright law terminology in permission mandates, schools might 
intend that they have the legal effect of transferring nonexclusive rights to the school, 
thereby clarifying and fortifying the school’s rights to reproduce and disseminate faculty 
works.  If a publisher challenges the validity of these rights in court, however, the 
outcome is uncertain.
21
  It is unclear whether permission mandates satisfy the legal 
requirements for effective grants of nonexclusive licenses, and even if they do, whether 
those licenses will remain valid after the author subsequently transfers copyright 
ownership to a publisher.  Furthermore, the opt-out structure of permission mandates 
raises difficult questions of authorial autonomy.  In a widely followed lawsuit, Google 
sought to use a class action settlement agreement to automatically acquire nonexclusive 
rights to reproduce and sell millions of books, subject only to express opt-out by a book’s 
copyright owner.
22
  The court rejected the settlement agreement in large part because the 
opt-out structure offended traditional notions of authorial autonomy:  “[I]t is incongruous 
with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the onus on copyright owners to come 
forward to protect their rights . . . .”23  Is the opt-out structure of permission mandates 
likewise invalid for failure to protect the autonomy interests of authors?  Or in the context 
of scholarship, open access, and permission mandates should authorial autonomy be 
analyzed in a different light?  This Article considers whether permission mandates create 
legally enforceable licenses.  It argues that they do, and that the mandates do not raise the 
same concerns about authorial autonomy as the proposed Google Books settlement, 
largely because of the unique, nonmarket nature of scholarly production. 
¶6  Part II of this Article provides an overview of scholarly journal publishing and the 
movement for open access scholarship, which arose in part as a response to an academic 
publishing market many perceive as dysfunctional.  It then discusses the role of mandates 
as an important thrust of the open access movement.  Part III examines issues that arise 
 
18
 See Stevan Harnad, Post-Peer-Review Open Access, Commentary and Metrics Versus Post Hoc “Peer 




 See Suber, supra note 16 (“No serious [open access] advocate has ever said that [open access] 
literature is costless to produce, although many argue that it is much less expensive to produce than 
conventionally published literature, even less expensive than priced online-only literature.”). 
20
 See Peter Suber, A Field Guide to Misunderstandings About Open Access, SPARC OPEN ACCESS 
NEWSLETTER, no. 132, Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/04-02-
09.htm#fieldguide (“The [open access] movement focuses on [open access] for peer-reviewed literature.  
The goal is to remove access barriers, not quality filters.”); Suber, supra note 16 (“The question is not 
whether scholarly literature can be made costless, but whether there are better ways to pay the bills than by 
charging readers and creating access barriers.”). 
21
 Publishers are openly critical of open access mandates, and it is plausible that they might one day seek 
to challenge the validity of the licenses the mandates purport to grant. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, At 
Harvard, a Proposal to Publish Free on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at E1 (“Asked about the Harvard 
proposal, Allan Adler, vice president for legal and governmental affairs at the Association of American 
Publishers, said that mandates are what publishers object to . . . .  ‘As long as they leave the element of 
choice for authors and publishers,’ he said, ‘there isn’t a problem.’”). 
22
 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 680–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
23
 Id. at 682. 
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when copyright law, scholarship, and open access intersect.  It begins by highlighting the 
U.S. copyright law’s utilitarian roots and largely uniform focus on economic incentives to 
produce information goods, and the fact that the incentives for academics to produce 
scholarly articles are generally non-economic, so scholarly articles result from a 
nonmarket model of information production.  The poor interface between rules crafted 
under a proprietary conception of copyright and nonmarket scholarly production can 
result in “uniformity costs”—social costs resulting from applying uniform rules and 
granting uniform entitlements across diverse conditions—including uncertainty and 
suboptimal outcomes.
24
  Part III then analyzes two areas of U.S. copyright law that have 
particular relevance to open access scholarship and permission mandates but the rules of 
which incline toward an economic conception of information production resulting in 
uncertainty when applied to scholarly articles:  the rules that govern “works made for 
hire” (that is, does initial ownership of scholarship vest in the university or the faculty 
member employee), and the rules that govern the priority of nonexclusive licenses over 
conflicting transfers of copyright ownership.  In examining the work made for hire rules, 
Part III observes that whether scholars or their universities are the legal authors and initial 
owners of scholarship is a surprisingly unsettled question.  It then argues that although 
academic freedom and uniformity cost concerns provide powerful justifications for 
recognizing the controversial “teacher exception” to the work for hire rules, such an 
exception may nevertheless be unnecessary because a strong argument also exists that 
much scholarship is produced outside the scope of employment for work for hire 
purposes.  Lastly, Part III canvasses the copyright rules that govern the creation and 
durability of nonexclusive licenses, which are central to the open access model.  In 
particular, it examines the effects of and purposes underlying § 205(e) of the Copyright 
Act, which provides that a nonexclusive license evidenced in a writing signed by the 
grantor prevails over a conflicting subsequent transfer of copyright ownership. 
¶7  Part IV considers the enforceability of mandate-effectuated licenses.  First, it 
argues that permission mandates provide sufficient evidence of the grantor’s intent and 
the rights granted to create effective nonexclusive licenses.  Additionally, permission 
mandates provide sufficient evidence of the license’s existence, and provide potential 
copyright transferees (typically academic publishers) with sufficient notice of the 
nonexclusive license to establish the license’s priority over the subsequent transfer of 
copyright ownership.  Second, Part IV considers whether permission mandate licenses 
offend notions of authorial autonomy in copyright.  It discusses the two important aspects 
of authorial autonomy in copyright theory—economic autonomy and personal autonomy.  
It argues that authorial autonomy is far less of a concern for scholarly articles than for the 
books at issue in Authors Guild (the Google Books case) due to the nonmarket nature of 
scholarly article production coupled with academic community norms.  Accordingly, it 
does not substantially interfere with authors’ autonomy interests to find that the opt-out 
structure of permission mandates creates valid nonexclusive licenses in universities.  
Lastly, Part IV argues that courts should be mindful of the uniformity costs, introduced in 
Part III, that arise from applying to scholarly articles copyright rules developed to address 
proprietary models of information production.  Situating this argument within the existing 
literature on uniformity costs in intellectual property law, this Article argues that 
 
24
 See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 AM U. L. REV. 845 (2006). 
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applying copyright rules in a manner sensitive to the nonmarket nature of scholarly 
production is the most effective way to reduce these social costs, and reinforces the 
conclusion that mandate licenses are enforceable. 
¶8  By examining the enforceability of permission mandates, this Article seeks to 
provide a close analysis of the legal effect of permission mandates that seems needed but 
is missing from the scholarly literature.  This Article is not intended to argue that 
permission mandates are the optimal information access solution.  Whether the mandates 
are the best way to achieve their desired ends is an empirical question beyond the scope 
of this Article.  Rather, this Article takes the position that if the legal validity of 
permission mandates is challenged, there are compelling reasons not to nip them in the 
bud based on a rigid, textualist interpretation of copyright rules developed to address very 
different, economically centered appropriability problems that are largely irrelevant to 
scholarly articles.  Universities, by adopting permission mandates, signal that they view 
the mandates as an important tool for managing one of their most critical knowledge 
resources:  scholarly articles.  If courts can reasonably interpret the relevant copyright 
rules to permit schools to utilize permission mandates to archive scholarship and 
disseminate it freely to the public, they should do so.  This is especially true given that 
the goal of permission mandates is to promote the dissemination and advancement of 
knowledge—important copyright law objectives. 
¶9  Finally, to be clear, this Article’s analysis does not apply to all “scholarship”—an 
extremely broad term.  It is limited to scholarly articles.  The reason is that monographs, 
treatises, and the like may result from economic motivations since their authors are paid 
royalties, while authors of scholarly articles are not.  Additionally, and for largely that 
reason, the open access movement and the Harvard mandate strictly target scholarly 
articles. 
II. SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING AND THE MOVEMENT FOR OPEN ACCESS SCHOLARSHIP 
¶10  The movement for open access scholarship arose as a result of two converging 
factors:  an ongoing “serials crisis” in academic publishing, which has witnessed an 
unsustainably steep rise in scholarly periodical prices coupled with increasingly strained 
university library budgets,
25
 and the rise of the Internet, which enables instantaneous, 
inexpensive global information dissemination.
26
 
A. The Scholarly Journal Publishing Market 
1. The Roots of the Serials Crisis 
¶11  Traditionally, scholarly publishing was in the hands of learned societies.27  
Commercial publishers rose to prominence in the field during the latter half of the 
twentieth century as the federal government shifted toward private publication of 
federally funded research and other government-produced information, and learned 
 
25
 See YOUNG, supra note 2, at 1. 
26
 See Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 747–
51 (2006). 
27
 See generally JEAN-CLAUDE GUÉDON, IN OLDENBURG’S LONG SHADOW: LIBRARIANS, RESEARCH 
SCIENTISTS, PUBLISHERS, AND THE CONTROL OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING (2001). 
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societies shifted their journal publication duties to private publishing houses as a cost-
saving, revenue-generating measure.
28
  A diverse field of players and potentially high 
profit margins predictably induced consolidation in the commercial academic publishing 
industry.  By the 1990s, a small handful of international publishing conglomerates 
controlled the distribution of the most widely read, prestigious academic journals, and 
subscription fees for major scientific journals skyrocketed.
29
  Between 1990 and 2000, 
the average price of academic science and technology journals increased by 178%.
30
  In 
the humanities and social sciences, the average journal price increased by 185%.
31
  
University libraries were charged annual subscription fees as high as $20,000 for some 
commercially published major scientific journals (as much as six times higher than fees 
for nonprofit journals in the same field), while the publishers enjoyed profit margins 
nearing forty percent.
32
  The rise in journal subscription fees, coupled with increasingly 
tight acquisition budgets at many university libraries, has led many university libraries to 
pare down their journal subscriptions.
33
  Journals that institutions drop often seek to 
offset those losses by raising prices even further for their remaining subscribers.
34
  Many 
university libraries are also forced to offset costs by purchasing fewer books, resulting in 




¶12  Several unique features of the academic publishing market catalyze the trend of 
higher access costs.  Once a journal establishes itself as a “must have” title in its subject 
matter area and attracts top scholarship in the field, it effectively becomes a miniature 
monopoly because of the absence of adequate substitutes.
36
  Such must-have journals 
therefore have low price elasticity; that is, libraries will continue to purchase the title 
 
28
 Nancy Kranich, Countering Enclosure: Reclaiming the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 85, 87–88 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE]. 
29
 Id.; see also Stephen Pinfield, Libraries and Open Access: The Implications of Open-Access 
Publishing and Dissemination for Libraries in Higher Education Institutions, in DIGITAL CONVERGENCE: 
LIBRARIES OF THE FUTURE 119, 123 (Rae Earnshaw & John Vince eds., 2008). 
30
 SQW LTD., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PUBLISHING: A REPORT COMMISSIONED 






 Kranich, supra note 28, at 88. 
33
 Journals, the Cost of Education, and the Value We (Don’t) Get for Our Money, SPARC, 
http://www.arl.org/sparc/students/journalvalue.shtml (last visited June 3, 2012); Philippe C. Baveye, 
Sticker Shock and Looking Tsunami: The High Cost of Academic Serials in Perspective, 41 J. SCHOLARLY 
PUBLISHING 191, 194 (2010); OPEN SOC’Y INST., GUIDE TO BUSINESS PLANNING FOR LAUNCHING A NEW 
OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL 5 (2d ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.soros.org/openaccess/pdf/business_planning.pdf. 
34
 John Willinsky, The Nine Flavours of Open Access Scholarly Publishing, 49 J. POSTGRADUATE MED. 
263, 266 (2003). 
35
 See GARY HALL, DIGITIZE THIS BOOK!: THE POLITICS OF NEW MEDIA, OR WHY WE NEED OPEN 
ACCESS NOW 42–43 (2008); see also Kranich, supra note 28, at 87–88. 
36
 Pinfield, supra note 29, at 123; see also WELLCOME TRUST REPORT, supra note 30, at 15; THOMAS M. 
SUSMAN ET AL., PUBLISHER MERGERS: A CONSUMER-BASED APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 23 
(2003), available at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/whitepaperv2final.pdf (“[D]ifferent journals in the same 
academic field are not substitutes in the same way that two brands of consumer products, like auto tires, 
might be.  Since academic journals are the source of original research, each journal is in reality a poor 
substitute for any other in the same field.”). 
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even if the price increases because while the consumers of the content (researchers) will 
demand access to it, they are not the purchasers, so “price signals do not operate as they 
would in most markets.”37  This enables publishers to impose price increases higher than 
the rate of inflation and well above production costs.
38
  Indeed, the nature of the market 
allows publishers of must-have journals to gain market share through price increases, as 
they force libraries operating on fixed budgets to drop subscriptions to other journals that 
may be perceived as less essential.
39
  These effects have led some researchers to conclude 
that the academic journal publishing market is dysfunctional.
40
 
¶13  Adding insult to injury for university administrators, the universities themselves 
subsidize the production of much of the research and scholarship published in academic 
journals.
41
  Universities pay the salaries of professors, assistants, and graduate students 
who perform the research and produce the scholarship, and universities routinely provide 
substantial grants and other funding to support research and scholarship.  Universities 
also provide the physical means of scholarship production:  laboratories, equipment, 
offices, libraries, and computers in and on which research is conducted, analyzed, and 
communicated in scholarly works.  In other words, universities furnish many of the vital 
tools, inputs, and funds that make scholarship possible.  The scholars who write the 
articles (and who are customarily treated as the copyright owners)
42
 typically then 
transfer the copyright to journal publishers for no monetary compensation.  Universities 
are then obliged to buy (or lease)
43
 back, sometimes at extremely high prices, the 
scholarship they collectively supported and subsidized. 
¶14  What do journals provide to scholars and universities in return for their fees?  
Journals add value by providing legitimization of scholarship through organizing the peer 
review process—a crucial component of open, rigorous scholarly inquiry.44  Some 
journals provide substantive or technical editing services.  Most importantly, however, 
journals offer branding.  The names of the most famous journals in a given field are 
generally viewed as proxies for quality and cutting-edge scholarship.  Scholars seek to 
have their works published in the most highly regarded journals because of the associated 
prestige, and universities view having access to those journals as critical to accessing the 
latest, most influential scholarship. 
¶15  Digital distribution enabled by the Internet is a double-edged sword for academic 
publishers and universities.  The Internet’s ubiquity has enabled widespread unauthorized 
duplication and dissemination of copyrighted works, including works of scholarship.  It 
has also enabled and encouraged many scholars to authorize free dissemination of their 
 
37
 Pinfield, supra note 29, at 123; see also WELLCOME TRUST REPORT, supra note 30, at 15. 
38




 Id. (citing recent independent studies sponsored in Europe, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, 
SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS: FREE FOR ALL?, REPORT, 2003-4, H.C. 399-I (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmsctech/399/399.pdf; Directorate-General 
for Research, Study on the Economic and Technical Evolution of the Scientific Publication Markets in 
Europe (Jan. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/pdf/scientific-publication-
study_en.pdf (EC)). 
41
 See CHRISTINE L. BORGMAN, SCHOLARSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE: INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, 
AND THE INTERNET 111 (2007). 
42
 See infra Part III.B (discussing initial copyright ownership). 
43
 See infra text accompanying notes 47–52. 
44
 See BORGMAN, supra note 41, at 66. 
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scholarship by making their articles publicly available for free download from the web,
45
 
perhaps affecting the market for some journal subscriptions, and undoubtedly sparking 
deeper questions about the long-term viability of commercial academic publishing.  At 
the same time, new digital information technologies have led to lucrative new business 
models for publishers, particularly in the form of vast databases of digitized works, both 
copyrighted and in the public domain, for which universities pay substantial access fees.
46
 
¶16  The e-subscription approach allows publishers to deemphasize physical media 
(which are costly to produce and in some senses notoriously difficult to control once they 
are in the hands of users who can photocopy their pages, loan them, resell them, and so 
on) and shift to a service model, which allows publishers to license content—as opposed 
to selling physical copies—giving publishers far more control over pricing and use of the 
content.
47
  Electronic subscription services offer unprecedented convenience, speed, and 
search functionality, but these features can come at a steep cost, both financially and in 
preservability terms.  Annual subscription fees for a single electronic bundle from one 
publisher can range from half a million dollars to over $2 million, further straining 
maxed-out library budgets.
48
  Publishers frequently condition access to the most desired 
journals on the purchasing of less popular journals
49
 or bundle a number of the most 
desired journals together, with minimal flexibility to select or cancel titles.
50
  The 
bundling model effectively ensures publishers are able to charge more for top content and 
makes it more difficult for libraries to cancel subscriptions.
51
  Because libraries 
frequently need to purchase licenses for multiple bundles to satisfy their collection 
requirements, they often pay for duplicate journals.  Moreover, subscription-licensing 
terms limit database access to current subscribers only.  If a university subscribes for a 
decade and then cancels, its access terminates.  A school that purchases access to the 
same content year after year will not acquire a single permanent title in the end, despite 
spending millions of dollars.
52
 
2. Peer-Review and the Scholarly Article Production Process 
¶17  The production process for scholarly articles varies among disciplines, but can 
generally be described as follows.  It begins with research into a specific question, issue, 
 
45
 Id. at 88. 
46
 Carroll, supra note 26, at 748. 
47
 For example, academic publishers’ digital licenses are often structured to require universities to pay 
on a per-use basis, a pricing model that was impossible with physical media. BORGMAN, supra note 41, at 
112. 
48
 Ted Bergstrom, Watching Your Cards in the Big Deal, ASS’N RES. LIBR. (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/mm11sp-bergstrom.pdf. 
49
 Kranich, supra note 28, at 87–88. 
50




 Adrienne Muir, Digital Preservation: Awareness, Responsibility and Rights Issues, 30 J. INFO. SCI. 
73, 74 (2004).  However, to address this concern, some publishers now permit “perpetual access, ” that is, 
“the ability to retain access to previously paid for electronic journals after the contractual agreement for 
these materials has passed in the same way as the [sic] would have previously retained print copies on 
library shelves for future years.” Perpetual Access, OXFORD JOURNALS, 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/for_librarians/perpetual_access.html (last visited June 3, 2012).  Oxford 
University Press, for example, permits subscribers to have perpetual access to PDF copies of journal 
volumes covered by a subscription even after the subscription has lapsed. Id. 
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or area, and the research and data-gathering in all disciplines builds upon and informs 
existing scholarship in the field.  The next stage is the analysis and synthesis of the data 
or other products of the research, which scholars organize and synthesize with theories or 
commentary, ultimately reducing it to an article intended for publication in a scholarly 
journal.  During this process (and often during the research stage as well), the scholar will 
usually communicate with peers about the research and resultant article, including private 
discussions with colleagues and peers, presentations of findings and theories at academic 
conferences, and seeking feedback by circulating preprints of an article privately among 
peers or publicly by posting it on a personal webpage, a university repository, or an open 
access repository such as arXive.org or SSRN.com.
53
  All articles draw upon previous 




¶18  When the article is ready to begin the publication process, the author submits it to 
journals, initiating a prepublication quality control process.  In most disciplines (law is a 
notable exception),
55
 this process involves formal peer review as the primary quality 
control mechanism.
56
  Peer reviews are organized by journal staff; the reviewers are 
typically prominent scholars in the field selected by the journal to read and comment on 
submissions, and advise the journal on which papers to reject and which to accept and on 
which, if any, conditions (for example, that the article author make certain minor or 
substantial revisions).  In hopes of assuring confidentiality and objectivity, the peer 
review process is typically “blind,” that is, the reviewers’ identities are withheld from the 
author.  Sometimes the peer review process is “double blind,” meaning the author’s 
identity is also withheld from the reviewers.
57
  Naturally, the more prestigious or 
influential a journal is, the more selective it tends to be. 
¶19  Since the advent of e-journals and digital scholarship archives, several traditional 
functions of publishers have become less essential to the production and dissemination of 
scholarly articles—in particular, printing and binding, sales and distribution, and even 
layout and formatting.
58
  Some of the services journals provide remain as valuable as ever 
to the article production process, notably the filtering and legitimization functions, 
including arranging peer reviews.  Nevertheless, while there are certainly costs involved 
in providing these services, they do not necessarily justify the high prices many journals 
charge or the meteoric rise in pricing over the past two decades.
59
  It is also notable that 
peer reviewers are usually not paid for their services.
60
  The substance, quality, and utility 
 
53
 See BORGMAN, supra note 41, at 47–74. 
54
 See id. at 47. 
55
 See Carroll, supra note 26, at 751-54. 
56
 See Fytton Rowland, The Peer-Review Process, 15 LEARNED PUBLISHING 247, 247 (2002). 
57
 Id. at 247–48. 
58
 This is not to suggest that digital distribution of scholarship is a panacea that provides a complete or 
perfect replacement to print publishing.  One major challenge presented by electronic distribution is 
preservation. See Muir, supra note 52, at 73.  Format compatibility raises other concerns. BORGMAN, supra 
note 41, at 245–48.  Migrating the information to new formats has its own substantial risks and costs. Id. 
59
 See Peter Suber, Creating an Intellectual Commons Through Open Access, in UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 28, at 171, 173. 
60
 See id.; see also Leanne Tite & Sara Schroter, Why Do Peer Reviewers Decline to Review?: A Survey, 
61 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 9, 9, 12 (2007). 
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B. The Open Access Movement 
1. The Rise of the Movement 
¶20  The combination of library budgets pressured by soaring journal costs and the high 
barriers to information access as a result of the traditional proprietary rights-based 
publishing model pushed many university librarians, administrators and faculty to 
vociferously pursue new publishing and distribution models for scholarship that utilize 
empowering and cost-reducing features of the Internet.  A movement for “open access” 
scholarship emerged in the mid-1990s and has gained considerable momentum since, 
influenced by traditional open science norms as well as a number of closely connected 
social, political, and economic theories espousing the societal benefits of making 
scholarship publicly accessible and unfettered by financial, technological, or legal 
barriers.
62
  Open access proponents argue that the optimal and inevitable solution to the 
dysfunctional academic publishing market and restrictive access to information is to 
make all scholarship freely and publicly available online.
63
 
2. “Open Access” Does Not Equal “No Copyright” 
¶21  Most open access advocates do not suggest that open access and copyright are 
mutually exclusive or that society would be better off if all copyright rights in scholarship 
were eliminated.
64
  At a minimum, open access requires the copyright owner to grant 
 
61
 Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Exclusion or Efficient Pricing?: The “Big Deal” Bundling of 
Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 120 (2004). 
62
 See BORGMAN, supra note 41, at 101; Yochai Benkler, The Idea of Access to Knowledge and the 
Information Commons: Long-Term Trends and Basic Elements, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 217, 223–26 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010). 
63
 See generally Nigel Shadbolt et al., The Open Research Web, in OPEN ACCESS: KEY STRATEGIC, 
TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 8, at 195, 195. 
64
 Professor Shavell, however, has recently argued that a strong economic case can be made for 
statutorily abolishing copyright rights in all scholarship (scholarly articles as well as books and 
monographs). Steven Shavell, Should Copyright of Academic Works be Abolished?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
301 (2010).  In Professor Shavell’s view, since academic authors create scholarship for substantially 
nonmarket reasons, eliminating copyright protection for scholarship would have little impact on its 
production, and substantial social benefits would follow from making scholarship freely available. Id. at 
301–04.  Journals would, however, be affected, so he argues that universities and grantors should pay the 
journals publication fees so they can recover first-copy costs. Id. at 320–21.  In sum, he argues that “[i]f 
publication fees would be largely defrayed by universities and grantors, as [he] suggest[s] would be to their 
advantage, then the elimination of copyright of academic works would be likely to be socially desirable:  it 
would not compromise academic publication activity and would yield the social benefits of a copyright-free 
regime.” Id. at 304.  Paradoxically, he reasons, the increased access to scholarly works brought about by 
eliminating copyright might incentivize scholars to publish more scholarship than they currently do because 
scholars would be getting more of what they are after:  readership and esteem. Id. at 320–21. 
Professor Shavell’s argument is compelling in many respects, and is attractive for the reasons he 
suggests.  Nevertheless, the argument raises practical and philosophical difficulties.  First, as Professor 
Shavell acknowledges, his proposal to amend the statute to eliminate copyright protection for scholarship 
potentially conflicts with U.S. intellectual property treaty obligations.
 
Id. at 339 n.82.  Second, this Author 
is less optimistic than Professor Shavell that the proposal would be well received by academics and 
universities. Id. at 340 (making the case for why universities and academics would be likely to favor 
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rights to the public permitting the public to view, copy, and distribute a work.  The 
author’s retention of rights in the work, however, is compatible with most definitions of 
open access.  For example, the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS) 
permission mandate provides that the author retains copyright ownership in the work.
65
  
Likewise, the Budapest Open Access Initiative, an influential statement of open access 
principles, recognizes the need to grant users certain permissions while simultaneously 
ensuring scholars retain certain exclusive rights, namely the rights of attribution and 
integrity
66—neither of which is expressly recognized for literary works under U.S. 
copyright law.
67
  Thus open access content, as it is usually defined, is distinct from public 
domain content.  In the case of open access works, the copyright owner retains some 
rights in the work but grants other rights to the public, while public domain content is 




3. Two Forms of Open Access: Open Access Journals Versus Self-Archiving 
Scholarship Online 
¶22  In theory, building a comprehensive corpus of freely and publicly accessible 
scholarship is relatively straightforward.  Proponents have identified two ways in which 
scholars can make their articles open access.  One may choose to publish in one of the 
growing number of academic journals that make their publications freely available to the 
public online (sometimes called the “gold road” to open access).  Alternatively, one may 
publish in a subscription-access journal but self-archive an e-print of the article in an 
online open access repository (sometimes called the “green road” to open access).69  
 
abolition of copyright in scholarship).  That is true even if, as Professor Shavell recommends, id. at 337 
n.79, Congress replaces economic rights in scholarship with the right of attribution. See, e.g., Kevin Smith, 
Maybe Not So Revolutionary After All, SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATIONS @ DUKE, 
http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2009/09/07/maybe-not-so-revolutionary-after-all/ (“My biggest 
concern with [Professor Shavell’s] proposal is that it neglects one benefit which academic authors do gain 
from copyright, the ability to control the dissemination of their work and, especially, the preparation of 
derivative works.”).  Permission mandates, which do not divest academics of any of their copyright rights, 
seem far more politically palatable than a proposal to divest academics of all their present rights and 
supplant them with new and untested rights.  Third, by seeking a statutory amendment to impose a top-
down solution, the proposal further complicates an already bloated copyright statute with yet another 
subject-matter-specific carve-out, instituting a bright-line rule with dramatic, across-the-board effects that 
are difficult to predict. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1637-38 (2003) (“The copyright model . . . [is one] in which industry-specific rules and exceptions 
have led to a bloated, impenetrable statute that reads like the tax code . . . .”). 
65
 See Harvard FAS Mandate, supra note 11. 
66
 Read the Budapest Open Access Initiative, supra note 3. 
67
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011) (enumerating the exclusive rights granted by the Act).  Nevertheless, the 
influence of “moral” rights can be found sprinkled throughout the U.S. Copyright Act. See ROBERT P. 
MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 156–58 (2011). 
68
 See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 
256–62 (2003). 
69
 See Stevan Harnad, The Green Road to Open Access: A Leveraged Transition, ELECTRONICS & 
COMPUTER SCI. (Jan. 7, 2004, 1:45 PM), http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Hypermail/Amsci/3379.html; 
Self-Archiving FAQ, EPRINTS, http://www.eprints.org/openaccess/self-faq/ (last visited June 3, 2012).  Note 
that open access proponents strongly favor authors depositing their articles in open access repositories 
rather than making them available on the author’s personal web page. See Swan, supra note 8, at 71. 
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Once an article is freely accessible via either method, it is indexed by search engines such 
as Google and immediately locatable and retrievable by anyone with Internet access.
70
 
¶23   “Gold” open access, that is, publishing in and developing open access journals, is 
an important open access strategy, but some leading open access advocates do not view it 
as the main thrust of the movement for the time being.  These advocates view persuading 
and motivating researchers and their institutions to make their works open access as a 
faster, more direct route to widespread open access than attempting to convert the entire 
academic publishing industry to a nonprofit open access model.  As one commentator put 
it, “a transition to green [open access] self-archiving already rests entirely in the hands of 
the research community (researchers, their institutions and their funders), whereas a 
transition to gold [open access] publishing depends on the publishing community.”71  The 
vast majority of academic journals worldwide—over ninety percent—are already 
compatible with green open access as they permit some form of open access self-
archiving.
72
  Of these journals, relatively few permit the author to self-archive a PDF of 
the final publication version of the article.
73
  Most permit the author to archive either 
“preprints” (a version of the article before it has been formally peer-reviewed) or 
“postprints” (a version that has undergone peer review and final edits and is identical to 
the published version except for formatting and page numbering).
74
  Many journals also 
require the author to observe an embargo period, typically up to twelve months following 
publication, during which the author may not self-archive any version of the article.
75
  
Others allow open access publication only if the author or the author’s institution pays a 
fee, typically several hundred to a few thousand dollars.
76
 
¶24  By most measures, the benefits of open access are significant.  Several studies 
indicate that articles made freely available online are cited considerably more frequently 
than subscription-access-only articles,
77
 although one recent study challenges that 
 
70
 See Stephen Cramond, Explainer: Open Access vs Traditional Academic Journal Publishers, 
CONVERSATION (July 27, 2011, 7:03 AM), http://theconversation.edu.au/explainer-open-access-vs-
traditional-academic-journal-publishers-2511. 
71
 Stevan Harnad, Gold Dust Still Obscuring the Clear Green Road to Open Access, OPEN ACCESS 
ARCHIVANGELISM (May 31, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://openaccess.eprints.org/index.php?/archives/813-Gold-
Dust-Still-Obscuring-the-Clear-Green-Road-To-Open-Access.html. But see Peter Murray-Rust, The 
Benefits and Limitations of Green Open Access, PETERMR’S BLOG (July 20, 2011, 5:47 PM), 
http://blogs.ch.cam.ac.uk/pmr/2011/07/20/the-benefits-and-limitations-of-green-open-access/ (arguing that 
the clarity of licenses provided for gold open access content and the fact that gold open access articles may 
be more readily located, linked to, and data mined because they “may be systematically discovered by 
iterating through the publisher’s tables of contents,” are significant advantages over green open access). 
72
 Publisher Policies on Self-Archiving, OPEN ACCESS SCHOLARLY INFO. SOURCEBOOK, 
http://www.openoasis.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=552&Itemid=375 (last visited 






 See Bo-Christer Björk et al., Open Access to the Scientific Journal Literature: Situation 2009, PLOS 
ONE, June 23, 2010, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0011273. 
76
 For a list of publishers providing the author-pays open access option, see Publishers with Paid 
Options for Open Access, SHERPA ROMEO, http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/PaidOA.html (last updated 
May 2, 2012). 
77
 See HALL, supra note 35, at 47 (citing studies indicating that open access articles are cited two to four 
times more frequently than their subscription-access only counterparts).  One study examined the research 
impact of more than 27,000 articles in subscription-access journals, about 22 percent of which had also 
been made available in open access repositories. Gargouri et al., supra note 7, at 1, 3.  It found that 
“[o]verall, [open access] articles are cited significantly more than non-[open access] articles,” however 




  That study does suggest, however, that making one’s article open access 
significantly boosts readership, if not citations.
79
  Increased citations and readership is 
important in a profession in which scholarly impact is the coin of the realm.  The broader 
societal benefits of open access are self-evident.  Knowledge is an essential social 
resource, vital to education, cultural and physical well-being, as well as political self-
determination.  Information is not just consumed; it also functions as an input in its own 
production process.
80
  The creation of new knowledge is made possible only by accessing 
preexisting knowledge to build upon, test, assimilate, and incorporate.  The greater the 
access is to the existing corpus of knowledge, the greater the potential for new knowledge 
to be created.  As the cliché goes, no library in the world can afford to purchase and store 
all 2.5 million scholarly articles published annually in the 25,000 scholarly journals that 
exist worldwide.  Thus, in theory, open access has the potential to benefit researchers at 
every institution, rich or poor.  But the benefits of open access are especially evident to 
institutions in the United States and around the world that cannot afford expensive 
subscription access.
81
  In short, “open access of information provides a universal public 
 
“[t]he [open access] advantage is greater for the more citable articles, not because of a quality bias from 
authors self-selecting what to make [open access], but because of a quality advantage, from users self-
selecting what to use and cite, freed by [open access] from the constraints of selective accessibility to 
subscribers only.” Id. at 1.  Another study examined the research impact of law review articles by studying 
citation rates over an eighteen year period for self-archived open access articles versus subscription-access-
only articles published in the same three subscription access law reviews. James M. Donovan & Carol A. 
Watson, Citation Advantage of Open Access Legal Scholarship 103 L. LIBR. J. 553 (2011).  The authors 
concluded that 
[t]he open access advantage reported for other bodies of literature extends to legal 
scholarship, albeit with some identified caveats.  Open access is most likely to impact 
other legal scholarship, less so the citations within court opinions.  The expected impact 
of the average article is an additional fifty-eight percent above that made by works of 
similar quality appearing in the same or similar publication venue. 
Id. at 573. 
78
 Philip M. Davis, Open Access, Readership, Citations: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Scientific 
Journal Publishing, 25 FASEB J. 2129, 2129 (2011) (examining the research impact of 3,245 subscription-
access journal articles, 21 percent of which were randomly selected by the journal publishers for concurrent 
open access release, and concluding that the open access articles “received significantly more downloads 
and reached a broader audience . . . , yet were cited no more frequently, nor earlier, than subscription-
access control articles . . . .  These results may be explained by social stratification, a process that 
concentrates scientific authors at a small number of elite research universities with excellent access to the 
scientific literature.  The real beneficiaries of open access publishing may not be the research community 
but communities of practice that consume, but rarely contribute to, the corpus of literature.”). 
79
 See id. at 2131 (finding no advantage in the frequency with which open access articles are cited but 
noting a significant increase in readership of open access versus subscription-access-only articles). 
80
 See Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 657, 672 (2010); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 37 (2006). 
81
 See YOUNG, supra note 2, at 5 (2009) (“[S]cholars in the developing world find themselves unable to 
fully participate in or benefit from research.  While some publishers provide free or discounted access in 
developing countries, not all publishers participate, and countries like India are left out.”) (footnote 
omitted); Peter Murray-Rust, What’s Wrong with Scholarly Publishing? It’s Only for Academics, 
PETERMR’S BLOG (Aug. 2, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://blogs.ch.cam.ac.uk/pmr/2011/08/02/what’s-wrong-
with-scholarly-publishing-it’s-only-for-academics/. But see Andrew Robinson, Open Access: The View of a 
Commercial Publisher, 4 J. THROMBOSIS & HAEMOSTASIS 1454, 1456 (2006) (“Open access to research 
literature would significantly improve the quality of health care and scientific research in some of the 
world’s poorest nations, or so the story goes.  So, what about HINARI, the Health InterNetwork Access to 
Research Initiative that is jointly administered with the World Health Organization?  This philanthropic 
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good:  the more quality information, the greater the public good.”82  For these reasons, 
most scholars agree in principle with open access scholarship.
83
 
4. The Emergence of Open Access Mandates 
¶25  Despite widespread agreement with open access principles, researchers voluntarily 
self-archive a relatively small percentage of articles—about fifteen to twenty percent—in 
open access repositories,
84
 even in universities that have established their own 
institutional repositories and encourage faculty to self-archive.
85
  Efforts by funders to 
encourage open access have had equally tepid results.  When the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH)
86—following a Congressional directive—implemented a policy in 2005 
requesting but not requiring that publications resulting from NIH funding be made freely 
available in NIH’s open access repository, the participation rate was around nineteen 
percent.
87
  There are myriad reasons
88
 for the low participation rates, but among the more 
pronounced are:  a lack of researcher awareness of open access;
89
 researcher concerns 
that articles in electronic formats are less permanent and more alterable or corruptible 
than those in print;
90
 researcher concerns and misconceptions about infringing copyrights 
by self-archiving their own articles or downloading others’ open access articles;91 
researcher concerns that self-archiving an article before publication will render it 
unpublishable in a journal;
92
 and researcher concerns that open access generally threatens 
the survival of smaller, learned societies reliant on journal publication income.
93
 
¶26  Given the low voluntary participation rates, open access advocates recognize that 
their goal of one day seeing all of the world’s scholarly output freely available online94 is 
 
initiative was launched in 2002, and makes available online across 1590 institutions in 113 countries, over 
3230 journals from more than 60 publishers . . . .  So, the subscription is not the problem, and yet, in 
reality, usage of JTH [the Journal of Thrombosis and Haemostasis] is depressingly low.  How can this be, 
if there is an insatiable appetite for knowledge that can only be met by [open access]?  Maybe it is because 
the basic infrastructure is absent.”). 
82
 Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons, in 
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 28, at 3, 13. 
83
 See Eyal Amiran, The Open Access Debate, 18 SYMPLOKE 251, 252 (2010); Alma Swan & Sheridan 
Brown, Authors and Open Access Publishing, 17 LEARNED PUBLISHING 219, 223 (2004). 
84
 Gargouri et al., supra note 7, at 1 (“Only about 15–20% of the 2.5 million articles published annually 




 The National Institutes of Health, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is 
the world’s largest funder of medical research, funding research at universities in every state in the United 
States and around the world. About NIH, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last updated 
Dec. 5, 2011). 
87
 See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Capitalizing on Discovery, in BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, FISCAL YEARS 2008 & 2009, ABOUT NIH 1-39, 1-41 (2010), available 
at http://report.nih.gov/biennialreport/pdf/NIH_Biennial_FY0809_Volume_I.pdf. 
88
 See Self-Archiving FAQ, supra note 69 (listing (and refuting) thirty-eight concerns about open access 
commonly expressed by researchers). 
89
 Swan, supra note 8, at 70. 
90






 See Vanessa Spedding, Will Learned Societies Signal the Change?, RES. INFO., May/June 2004, 
http://www.researchinformation.info/features/feature.php?feature_id=117. 
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 See Stevan Harnad, Open Access, EPRINTS, http://www.eprints.org/openaccess/ (last visited June 3, 
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unattainable through reliance on researchers’ good will alone.95  Moreover, surveys 
indicate that nearly all researchers (ninety-five percent) would self-archive their articles if 
a university or funder mandate compelled them to do so.
96
  Many open access advocates 
therefore argue that maximizing participation is best achieved through institutional or 
funder mandates that require faculty or researchers to make their articles freely accessible 
online.
97
  Open access advocates, therefore, have sought the development and 
proliferation of mandates imposed by funders or universities requiring researchers to 
deposit their works in an online open access repository.  Two types of mandates have 
developed:  (1) “deposit” mandates, which require faculty members themselves to deposit 
their scholarly articles in an open access repository, and (2) “permission” mandates, 
which grant the institution a license to, at a minimum, reproduce and distribute articles 
produced by its faculty.
98
 
i) Deposit Mandates 
¶27  The Wellcome Trust and the NIH are both funding institutions that employ deposit 
mandates.  Since 2005, the Wellcome Trust, the United Kingdom’s largest non-
governmental biomedical research funder, has made open access a condition of funding.  
Specifically, it requires that “electronic copies of any research papers that have been 
accepted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal, and are supported in whole or in part 
by Wellcome Trust funding,” be made publicly available in PubMed Central, the NIH’s 
full-text open access article repository,
99
 within six months of publication.
100
  Beginning 
in 2008, the NIH amended its policy at Congress’s direction from one that encourages 
open access to one that requires funding recipients to deposit their resultant postprint 
research articles in PubMed Central within twelve months of publication.
101
  So far, the 
results have largely borne out predictions that switching from a policy encouraging open 
access to one mandating it would increase participation rates:  in the first year following 






 See, e.g., Open Access Policies for Universities and Research Institutions, ENABLING OPEN 
SCHOLARSHIP, http://www.openscholarship.org/jcms/c_6226/open-access-policies-for-universities-and-
research-institutions?hlText=policie (last visited June 3, 2012) [hereinafter Open Access Policies] 
(“Policies that rely on voluntary action by researchers fail.”). 
96
 See Swan, supra note 8, at 69, 70 fig.7.4. 
97
 See, e.g., David Shulenburger, University Public-Access Mandates Are Good for Science, PLOS 
BIOLOGY, Nov. 10, 2009, at 2, 
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1000237 (“The most 
effective method of ensuring that the majority of important work is available is by replicating across the 
academy university public-access mandates like those of Harvard, MIT, and Kansas throughout the 
world.”); Open Access Policies, supra note 95 (“The fact is that if research managers wish to establish a 
repository that successfully gathers together the whole output of the institution, then a mandatory Open 
Access policy is needed.”). 
98
 See Suber, supra note 2. 
99
 See PUBMED CENTRAL, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ (last visited June 3, 2012). 
100
 Open Access Policy: Position Statement in Support of Open and Unrestricted Access to Published 
Research, WELLCOME TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Policy/Spotlight-issues/Open-
access/Policy/index.htm (last visited June 3, 2012).  The Wellcome Trust requires that articles be made 
available through both the U.S. and U.K. versions of PubMed Central. Id. 
101
 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 87, at 1-41. 
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Proposed legislation in the United States would require that eleven U.S. government 
agencies adopt deposit mandates for research resulting from funding.
103
 
¶28  A number of universities and departments within universities have also adopted 
policies requiring faculty to self-archive their scholarly articles in an institutional open-
access repository.  Worldwide since 2004, well over one hundred universities and nearly 
fifty institutions that fund research have adopted policies mandating that their faculty or 
funding recipients deposit their works in an online open access repository.
104
 
ii) Permission Mandates 
¶29  The 2008 Harvard University FAS mandate was the first permission mandate 
adopted anywhere, and most U.S. schools that have adopted mandates have followed the 
general form and language of the FAS mandate.
105
  The FAS mandate was also the first 
mandate adopted by university faculty and not imposed by administrators:  the FAS 
faculty voted unanimously to bind itself to the policy terms.  At the time of this writing, 
thirty-three U.S. schools and departments have adopted mandates, the vast majority of 
which are permission mandates.  Schools that have adopted permission mandates include:  
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; seven schools within Harvard University;
106
 
Duke University; Princeton University; Oberlin College; Trinity University; the 
University of North Texas; the University of Kansas; Emory University; and Stanford 
University School of Education.
107
 
¶30  Deposit mandates’ key limitation is their reliance on the participation of each 
faculty member.  Permission mandates, on the other hand, empower the school to 
proactively archive by purporting to grant the institution a broad, nonexclusive license to 
exercise all copyright rights in every faculty member’s scholarly articles, though usually 
limited to nonprofit uses only.  Under the terms of the Harvard FAS policy, 
Each Faculty member grants to the President and Fellows of Harvard College 
permission to make available his or her scholarly articles and to exercise the 
copyright in those articles.  In legal terms, the permission granted by each 
Faculty member is a nonexclusive, irrevocable, paid-up, worldwide license to 
exercise any and all rights under copyright relating to each of his or her scholarly 
 
103
 See Federal Research Public Access Act of 2010, H.R. 5253, 111th Cong. (2010). But see Research 
Works Act, H.R. 3699, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing to repeal the NIH public access policy). 
104
 See ROARMAP, supra note 5. 
105
 Suber, supra note 2. 
106
 At the time of this writing, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard Law School, the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, the Graduate School of Education, Harvard Business School, Harvard 
Divinity School, and the Graduate School of Design have all adopted a sub-institutional mandate. Id.  
Harvard’s governance structure involves considerable sub-institutional autonomy, thus the policies are not 
adopted university wide.  Most faculties within the university have adopted a mandate similar to the FAS 
policy. 
107
 ROARMAP, supra note 5.  At the time of this writing, a permission mandate is under discussion at 
the University of California.  See generally UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY AND SCHOLARLY 
COMMUNICATION, AN OPEN ACCESS POLICY FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: MATERIALS FOR 
DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION (Mar. 1, 2012), available at 
http://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu/openaccesspolicy/UCOLASC-Open-Access-Policy-Discussion-
Documents-March2.pdf. 
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articles, in any medium, and to authorize others to do the same, provided that the 
articles are not sold for a profit.
108
 
¶31  The FAS policy’s opt-out regime is key to its structure.109  To make the policy 
politically palatable, it provides that “[t]he Dean or the Dean’s designate will waive 
application of the policy for a particular article upon written request by a Faculty member 
explaining the need.”110  Thus, the policy sets the default 180 degrees from that of the 
traditional grant of copyright rights:  instead of requiring every individual faculty 
member to expressly grant the school a nonexclusive license for every scholarly article, 
the school, by virtue of the policy, automatically acquires a prospective nonexclusive 
license to archive and distribute every scholarly article for which a faculty member has 
not expressly opted out.
111
 Regarding the legal mechanics of the waiver provision, 
because the license is expressly irrevocable, a faculty member’s request that the policy be 
waived should not to be construed as a revocation.  Rather, the waiver provision appears 
to be best construed as a binding commitment by the school to abandon its license upon 
the faculty member’s request.112  Although some observers argue that any policy that is 
waivable is not really a mandate at all,
113
 this Article refers to the policy as a mandate 
since it is typically referred to that way and because the policy does in fact set as the 
default a mandatory grant of a nonexclusive license. 
¶32  Unsurprisingly, permission mandates “directly contradict the publication policies of 
most scientific journals, and as such have led to difficult negotiations between publishers 
and universities adopting this approach.”114  As a result, some mandate schools and 
publishers have agreed to an embargo period of six to twelve months following 
publication during which the article cannot be deposited in an open access repository.
115
  
In addition, Harvard encourages its faculty to request that publishers sign an author-
proposed addendum to the publisher’s standard publication agreement.116  The addendum 
modifies the publication agreement to permit authors to retain various rights including the 
 
108
 Harvard FAS Mandate, supra note 11. 
109
 See THINH NGUYEN, OPEN DOORS AND OPEN MINDS: WHAT FACULTY AUTHORS CAN DO TO ENSURE 
OPEN ACCESS TO THEIR WORK THROUGH THEIR INSTITUTION 2 (2008), available at 
http://sciencecommons.org/wp-content/uploads/opendoors_v1.pdf. 
110
 Harvard FAS Mandate, supra note 11. 
111
 According to Stuart Shieber, who chaired of the faculty committee that recommended adoption of the 
FAS mandate, “by specifying rights retention and deposit for those cases where a waiver does not occur, 
[the policy] places the defaults in a better place.  Such changes in default are known to have dramatic effect 
on participation rates for activities ranging from 401K participation to organ donation.” Shieber, supra note 
9. 
112
 For a discussion of the judicial doctrine of copyright abandonment, which of course typically arises 
in the context of abandoning copyright ownership or exclusive rights, not nonexclusive licenses, see Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons 
Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 319–22 (2007). 
113
 See, e.g., Shieber, supra note 9 (“As any dean will tell you, there is no such thing as a mandate on 
faculty.”); Stevan Harnad, Optimizing Harvard’s Proposed Open Access Self-Archiving Mandate, OPEN 
ACCESS ARCHIVANGELISM (Feb. 12, 2008), http://openaccess.eprints.org/index.php?/archives/361-
guid.html. 
114
 Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
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right to reproduce and distribute the article, and expressly provides that the author’s 
transfer of copyright ownership to the publisher is subject to the prior grant of a 
nonexclusive license to the author’s institution or funder.117  Harvard also requests that its 
faculty back up the permission mandate license by memorializing the nonexclusive 
license grant in a separate, signed writing. 
III. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COPYRIGHT, SCHOLARSHIP, AND OPEN ACCESS 
A. Utilitarian Theory, Nonmarket Information Production, and Uniformity Costs 
¶33  As literary works, scholarly articles are protected by copyright law.118  Copyright 
law is designed to remedy an appropriability problem inherent in information products.
119
  
The problem stems from the fact that information in whatever form—text in a book or 
article, a song, a film, or some other medium of expression—is “nonrivalrous” in 
economic terms.  That is, the same information can exist in infinite minds or copies 
simultaneously, and one person’s possession and enjoyment of it does not reduce its 
availability to everyone else.
120
  Indeed, millions of others can copy that same work (as is 
often the case with popular works on the Internet), and all can simultaneously possess 
and enjoy copies of it. 
¶34  Because information is nonrivalrous, economic theory presumes that information 
goods are subject to a “public goods” problem.  That is, if authors are unable to cost-
effectively exclude competitors and nonpaying consumers from copying and consuming 
their information goods (such as books, movies, and so on), authors will be unable to 
recover their costs of producing information goods.  Authors will then cease to invest 
their time and efforts in creating them, resulting in underproduction of valuable 
information goods to society’s detriment.121  Copyright’s exclusive rights allow authors 
to capture the economic value of their information goods by erecting around the work 
legal barriers to access.  Thus, the utilitarian rationale for copyright is that social welfare 
is maximized when the greatest number of new works of knowledge and information are 
created, and that economic incentives enabled by exclusive rights are necessary to 
stimulate maximum production of creative works.  To achieve the optimal outcome, the 
exclusive rights should be limited so as not to extend any further than is necessary to 
produce the optimal level of creative output, otherwise society’s compelling interest in 
 
117
 See Scholarly Publ’g and Academic Res. Coal., Author Rights: Using the SPARC Author Addendum 
to Secure Your Rights as the Author of a Journal Article (2006), 
http://www.arl.org/sparc/author/addendum.shtml (providing an addendum template).  The author 
addendum proposed by the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC) provides 
that “where applicable . . . Publisher acknowledges that Author’s assignment of copyright or Author’s grant 
of exclusive rights in the Publication Agreement is subject to Author’s prior grant of a non-exclusive 
copyright license to Author’s employing institution and/or to a funding entity that financially supported the 
research reflected in the Article as part of an agreement between Author or Author’s employing institution 
and such funding entity, such as an agency of the United States government.” Id. 
118
 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011) (providing that copyright protection subsists “in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and including the broad category “literary works” 
among its eight enumerated subject matter categories). 
119
 See Carroll, supra note 24, at 849–50. 
120
 A key point here, of course, is that the copyrighted work contained in the pages of the book and 
represented by the words on the page is distinct from any particular physical copy of the book. 
121
 See Madison et al., supra note 80, at 666. 
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having reasonable access to that knowledge is unnecessarily burdened, resulting in a net 
social loss.
122
  The assumption that exclusive rights are necessary to spur the production 
of valuable works greatly influenced the development of U.S. copyright law.
123
 
¶35  Some, however, criticize the argument that exclusive rights are indispensable to the 
information production process as “woefully inadequate as a descriptive matter” and “a 
caricature”124 because the exclusive rights-based models “represent only a fraction of our 
information production system.”125  Scholarship is a well-cited example of an entire 
stratum of valuable information produced outside the exclusive rights—or market—
production model.
126
  Incentives for producing scholarly articles might range from a 
desire to attain tenure and career advancement, to attracting grant and research funding, 
to attracting consulting work, to receiving feedback from and engaging intellectually with 
peers, to an altruistic desire to share and disseminate knowledge, and often some 
combination of these.  But direct financial compensation from scholarly articles is not 
part of the equation since publishers do not pay scholars, and scholars do not earn 
royalties from the publication of their articles.
127
 
¶36  From a utilitarian perspective, intellectual property laws always impose 
“uniformity costs” as they grant entitlements that are sometimes stronger than necessary 
to motivate investment in innovation.
128
  The law does not discriminate based on author 
motivation or industry context—it grants the same entitlements and the same rules apply 
regardless of the circumstances of a work’s creation.  If a work protected under the 
current copyright law would have been created even under a regime of weaker or no 
copyright, then society suffers a net loss vis à vis that work because public access is 
restricted more than necessary.
129
  Nevertheless, society’s access to both is limited 
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 See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
123
 See Madison et al., supra note 80, at 667 (“At the core of IP law, as traditionally conceived, is the 
right to exclude, without which it is assumed that some producers would abandon their efforts for fear of 
free riding (unlicensed sharing) by competitors.”). 
124
 Id. at 668. 
125
 BENKLER, supra note 80, at 44. 
126
 The generally nonmarket motivations of academic researchers are separate from the question of the 
extent to which the university enterprise and the research itself are supported by direct or indirect collateral 
revenue streams based on exclusive rights, such as teaching services and tuition.  For a discussion of how 
the university information commons is embedded within and supported by a larger complex system of 
proprietary rights, public funding, and gifts, see Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1799–1804 (2010). 
127
 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 80, at 47, 97 (citing universities and other research institutes as 
examples of nonmarket information production and asserting that “the academic who writes for money is 
rendered suspect in her community of scholarship”); Suber, supra note 59, at 174–75 (“The focus of the 
[Open Access] movement is on a special category of content that does not earn royalties for its creators:  
peer-reviewed research articles and their preprints. . . .  [A]uthors want their work to be noticed, read, taken 
up, built upon, applied, used, and cited. . . .  These intangible rewards (made nearly tangible in tenure and 
promotion) compensate scholars for relinquishing royalties on their journal articles.”); Jessica Litman, The 
Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779, 782 (2006) (“The role of 
copyright in the dissemination of scholarly research is in many ways curious, since neither authors nor the 
entities that compensate them for their authorship are motivated by the incentives supplied by the copyright 
system. . . .  The authors of scholarly works (and the institutions that pay their salaries and support their 
research) have had no objection to paying for publishing in the currency of copyrights, since the copyrights 
had little intrinsic value in the academy.”). 
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 See Carroll, supra note 24, at 849–50. 
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uniformly.  Applying copyright law to scholarly articles clearly results in over-inclusion 
and overprotection:  scholarly articles face neither an appropriability problem (academic 
authors are compensated through salaries and do not sell their articles) nor an 
underproduction problem (production of scholarly articles does not rely on economic 
incentives or the market).  Thus, the restricted access to scholarship is a higher price than 
society needs to pay to ensure its production. 
¶37  While the literature on uniformity costs generally focuses on costs resulting from 
uniformity of intellectual property entitlements granted,
130
 such entitlement grants are 
embodied in rules.  One can say more broadly, then, that uniformity costs can result from 
applying to one context intellectual property rules devised presuming a different context.  
For example, the poor interface, discussed below, between copyright’s work made for 
hire rules and scholarly articles means those rules could easily lead to a result—a finding 
that the university is the legal author and owner of scholarly articles written by faculty—
that profoundly contradicts academic tradition and defies the expectations of all 
stakeholders (faculty, universities, and publishers).  The resultant costs are uncertainty 
about the legal entitlements each of these stakeholders holds, and potential disruption of 
the core academic community value of academic freedom. 
B. Initial Ownership: The Effect of Copyright’s Work Made for Hire  
Rules on Scholarship 
¶38  An examination of copyright law’s work made for hire rules is significant for two 
reasons.  First, since much of the discussion in this Article involves attempts to allocate 
copyright rights in scholarship, it is important to understand the surprisingly unsettled 
issue of who owns scholarship from the outset—the faculty member or the university.  
Second, the uncertainty resulting from applying the work made for hire rules to 
scholarship demonstrates uniformity costs of applying to a nonmarket information 
production model rules that were developed according to a proprietary conception of 
copyright.
131
  This Section proceeds by providing an overview of the issues raised by 
applying copyright law’s work made for hire doctrine to scholarship, discussing the 
judicially crafted “teacher exception” to the work made for hire rules, and discussing 
university policies, adopted in nearly all major research universities, that purport to 
recognize faculty copyright ownership in scholarship notwithstanding the work made for 
hire rules.  Lastly, this Section discusses the implications of university ownership of 
scholarship for academic freedom. 
 
130
 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 24, at 856–57 (introducing a dual typology of uniformity costs, both 
types highlighting the uniformity of rights and entitlements granted despite varying appropriability 
problems facing creators:  “Type I uniformity costs arise when the creators of the same class of subject 
matter face different magnitudes or types of the appropriability problem” but the law supplies the same 
rights and entitlements to all creators of that subject matter anyway; “Type II” uniformity costs result from 
varying appropriability problems not within the same industry or technological field but between different 
industries and technological fields). 
131
 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and 
Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 378 (2010) (noting “the underlying bias 
of contemporary copyright law in favor of proprietary production”). 
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1. Applying the Work Made for Hire Doctrine to Scholarship 
¶39  Ambiguity concerning the application of copyright law’s “work made for hire 
doctrine” to scholarship raises significant questions about whether scholars or their 
institutions are the initial copyright owners of scholarly works.  The general rule 
concerning copyright ownership is that it “vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work.”132  In most instances, of course, the “author” is the individual (or individuals) who 
actually created and fixed the work.  There is an important exception to this general rule, 
however.  In instances in which the author is an “employee” and creates the work “within 
the scope of his or her employment,” the Copyright Act provides that the work is “made 
for hire” and vests authorship and copyright ownership in the employer, although the 
employer and employee may expressly agree in a writing signed by both parties that the 
employee owns the copyright.
133
  The Copyright Act does not define “employee” or 
“scope of employment.”  However, the Supreme Court has held that one should consult 
agency law rules, as summarized in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, to determine 
whether to classify an individual as an employee (in which case the employer owns the 
copyright if the work was made within the scope of the employment) or an independent 
contractor (in which case the individual owns the copyright).
134
  The Restatement factors 
are meant to identify objective indicators of the existence (or lack thereof) of a 
conventional employer–employee relationship.135  The nonexhaustive list of factors to 
consider includes:  (1) whether the employer has the right to control the manner and 
means by which the work was completed; (2) the skill required to complete the work; (3) 
the source of the instrumentality and tools used to perform the work (including the 
provision of office space, computers, printers, and so on); (4) the location of the work; (5) 
the duration of the relationship between the parties; (6) the method of payment (for 
example, a recurring salary versus a one-time remuneration); (7) whether the hiring party 
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (8) the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; (9) the method of payment; (10) the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; (11) whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; (12) whether the hiring party is in business; (13) 
provision of employee benefits; and (14) the tax treatment of the hired party (for 
example, whether or not the employer withholds taxes).
136
 
¶40  It seems intuitive that a full-time, salaried professor at a university is an employee, 
and applying the aforementioned Reid agency law factors to the university–scholar 
 
132
 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (2011). 
133
 Id. §§ 101, 201(b).  As an alternative basis for finding that a work is “made for hire,” the statute 
enumerates nine specific categories of commissioned works created by independent contractors that can 
qualify as works for hire if the parties “expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire.” Id. § 101.  The nine specifically enumerated categories are:  (1) 
a contribution to a collective work; (2) part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; (3) a translation; 
(4) a supplementary work; (5) a compilation; (6) an instructional text; (7) a test; (8) answer material for a 
test; and (9) an atlas. Id. 
134
 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 220 (1958)).  Of course, even if the individual is deemed to be an independent contractor, the 
work could still be a work for hire if it falls within one of the nine enumerated categories in the definition 
of work for hire in § 101 and the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that it shall 
be considered a work made for hire. See supra note 133. 
135
 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. 
136
 Id. at 751–52. 
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relationship bears out that intuition.  After all, universities typically supply the key tools 
of the professor’s trade (library, books, office, computer, research stipends, 
administrative assistance, and so on), they typically provide professors with health 
insurance and other employee benefits, they typically pay professors regular, ongoing 
salaries, and they typically treat them as employees for tax purposes, withholding federal 
and state taxes.  Not all of the Reid factors necessarily point toward the existence of an 
employer–employee relationship in the university–scholar context.  For example, one can 
make a strong argument that universities do not “control the manner and means” by 
which the work is completed.  While scholarly publication is a general requirement for 
tenure and promotion at most institutions, schools rarely exercise or even desire to 
control specific works of scholarship.  Moreover, whatever general influence schools do 
have over scholarly production is muted in the case of tenured professors, who are “no 
longer directly measured by their scholarly output.”137  Nevertheless, there is no 
suggestion that all of the Reid factors need point unanimously toward the existence of an 
employer–employee relationship; an employer–employee relationship exists if the factors 
on balance indicate such a relationship.
138
 
¶41  Even if an employer–employee relationship is found to exist, the work is deemed 
“made for hire” only if it was created within the scope of employment.139  Courts cite 
three factors, also drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, as probative of 
whether the work was created within the scope of employment:  (1) whether the work is 
of the kind the employee was hired to perform; (2) whether the work “occurs 
substantially within authorized time and space limits”; and (3) whether the work “is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve” the employer.140  Applying these factors 
to works of faculty scholarship has led some commentators to conclude that scholarly 
articles fall within the scope of university faculty members’ employment, largely because 
scholarly publication is typically required for promotion and tenure.
141
  Below, this 
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 Jon Garon, The Electronic Jungle: The Application of Intellectual Property Law to Distance 
Education, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 146, 152 (2002). 
138
 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752–53 (1989) (holding that even when 
the hiring party exercises substantial control over the work product—the first of the common law of agency 
factors enumerated by the court—“the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the 
product is not dispositive,” and finding in that case that “all the other circumstances weigh heavily against 
finding an employment relationship”). 
139
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
140
 See, e.g., Avtec Sys. v. Pfeiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)). 
141
 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Open Access: Reconsidering University Ownership of 
Faculty Research, 85 NEB. L. REV. 351, 375–76 (2006) (“Like the case law, the commentators are not 
unanimous, but there seems to be a clear, if reluctant, consensus that the work-for-hire rules sweep in most 
of the traditional output of teachers and university faculty.”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee 
and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 599 (1987) ( “The dispositive issue [in a pre-Reid 
determination of whether professors’ scholarship falls within the 1976 Act’s work for hire provisions] is 
whether the production of scholarly material is ‘within the scope of employment,’ that is, a part of the job.  
Since scholarship clearly is a factor in decisions regarding tenure, promotion, salary increases, sabbatical 
leaves, and reduced teaching loads, scholarly works should now belong to universities rather than to faculty 
members.”) (footnotes omitted); Garon, supra note 137, at 152 (“For most tenure-track faculty positions, 
academic writing remains a requirement of the job.  Faculty members often receive mentoring by peers, 
secretarial and administrative support and sometimes receive stipends or other additional compensation.  
As such, the academic writings are part of the employment because they are obligations undertaken in order 
for the faculty member to receive tenure.”) (endnotes omitted); Thomas G. Field, Jr., From Custom to Law 
in Copyright, 49 IDEA 125, 144 (2008) (“Despite lack of incentive to claim ownership in some cases, 
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Article refutes the notion that this requirement necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
scholarly articles are created within the scope of employment for copyright purposes.
142
 
2. The Enigmatic “Teacher Exception” to the Work Made for Hire Doctrine 
¶42  Although the work made for hire rules arguably vest initial copyright ownership of 
scholarship in the employing institution, the academic community has proceeded, 
according to its own norms and tradition, to presume that initial ownership remains with 
the author.  This tradition has formally manifested in two ways.  First, some courts have 
recognized the tradition in academia as the basis for a common law “teacher exception” 
to copyright’s work made for hire rules.  Second, nearly all universities have now 




¶43  The teacher exception originated in a pair of cases under the 1909 Copyright Act,144 
receiving its most extensive discussion in Williams v. Weisser,
145
 a 1969 California 
appeals court decision.  In Williams, a UCLA anthropology professor sued a proprietor 
for infringing the professor’s common law copyright (hence the case was in state, not 
federal, court) by reproducing and selling notes taken at the professor’s lectures.146  The 
defendant argued that the professor lacked standing to sue because under the work for 
hire rules the university was the copyright owner.
147
  However, the court held that the 
professor’s expression, in the form of lectures, was sui generis and “should not be blindly 
thrown into the same legal hopper with valve designs, motion picture background music, 
commercial drawings” and other types of copyrighted works.148  This expression should 
be exempt from the work for hire rules because to hold otherwise would contravene 
custom and precedent as well as the intentions of the university and the professor.
149
  
Professors, the court reasoned, “are a peripatetic lot, moving from campus to campus.  
 
schools as employers own copyright in faculty works.”) (footnote omitted). 
142
 See infra Part III.B.4. 
143
 See infra Part III.B.3. 
144
 Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
145
 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543.  
146
 Id. at 544–45.  Note, therefore, that the defendant was not the employing institution but rather a third 
party maintaining that the professor-plaintiff lacked standing because the university, and not the professor, 
was the copyright owner under the work for hire rules.  One commentator has noted that “school ownership 
of copyright in employees’ work has been denied only when the issue is tangential to assertions by 
disputants entitled to little sympathy.” Field, supra note 141, at 144.  Of course, unsympathetic defendants 
raising the work for hire doctrine as a defense against an infringement claim are not unique to the 
university context, but are symptomatic of the challenges that arise from equitably applying the work for 
hire doctrine’s all-or-nothing ownership rules. See Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. 
v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘work for hire’ issue in Aldon Accessories 
arose as a defensive tactic adopted by a third-party infringer to dispute the validity of the plaintiff’s 
copyright.  This posture makes the ‘literal’ reading of the 1976 Act particularly unattractive, because it is 
the infringer and not the independent contractor who will benefit from a ruling that the work was not made 
‘for hire.’  In other words, the Aldon Accessories court may have been driven to create the narrow ‘actual 
control’ exception to the general rule that independent contractors hold the copyright under the 1976 Act by 
the fact that on appeal the defendant more or less conceded infringement but tried to escape liability on 
‘work for hire’ grounds.”). 
147
 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
148
 Id. at 547 (citations omitted). 
149
 Id. at 545–46. 
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The courses they teach begin to take shape at one institution and are developed and 
embellished at another.”150  To hold that an earlier employing university acquires 
copyright in portions of the professor’s lectures incubated there would unreasonably 
restrain the professor’s ability to later teach the same course at other institutions; 
universities, on the other hand, have few legitimate uses for copyright in lectures.
151
  
Thus, according to the court, concern about faculty mobility far outweighs any exiguous 
interest the university might have in copyright ownership. 
¶44  The teacher exception thus arose under the Copyright Act of 1909, which provided 
that “the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”152  
The 1909 Act did not specify whether a written agreement was necessary to rebut the 
statutory presumption of copyright ownership in the employer, but courts and 
commentators construed the 1909 Act to permit oral or implied agreements to situate 
copyright in the employee.
153
  Consequently, a custom by which employees retain 
copyright ownership could form the basis of an implied contract term between the 
employee and employer.
154
  This history suggests that the teacher exception rested on an 
implied agreement between university and professor, informed by custom, reserving 
copyright in the latter.  Because the 1976 Act amended the work for hire rules to require a 
writing signed by both parties to reserve copyright ownership in the employee,
155
 and 
because Congress did not expressly incorporate a teacher exception into the substantially 
amended 1976 work made for hire rules, commentators and courts have debated whether 
the exception survived the amendment.  A pair of Seventh Circuit decisions from the late 
1980s, both penned by former law professors,
156
 posited in dictum that the exception 
remains intact.  In the first of those, Weinstein v. University of Illinois,
157
 Judge 
Easterbrook wrote that although the copyright statute’s work for hire rules are “general 
enough to make every academic article a ‘work for hire’ and therefore vest exclusive 
control in universities rather than scholars,” it “has been the academic tradition since 
copyright law began” for professors to own the initial copyright in their “scholarly 
 
150
 Id. at 546. 
151
 Id. at 546–47. 
152
 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087–88 (1909) (originally codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 62, repealed 1976). 
153
 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[D] (2011) 
(“Although the current Act requires an agreement reserving rights in the employee to be contained in a 
written instrument signed by both parties, under Section 26 of the 1909 Act, as construed, such an 
agreement could be either oral or implied.  In accordance with general principles of contract law, this meant 
that a custom or usage whereby certain rights are reserved to the employee, if such custom or usage was 
known to the parties, or might be presumed to have been so known, would become an implied in fact term 




 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2011). 
156
 Commentators often point out that Judges Easterbrook and Posner, the respective authors of the 
Weinstein and Hayes opinions, are themselves law professors, hinting perhaps that their academic ties 
might have rendered them less than impartial on the subject. See, e.g., Assaf Jacob, Tort Made for Hire—
Reconsidering the CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96, 99–100 (2009) (colorfully raising the issue in a 
satirical, hypothetical dialog between a professor and an academic publisher in which the professor cites 
Weinstein and Hayes as proof that the teacher exception exists, “[a]nd the publisher replies dismissively, 
‘That’s just one Circuit’s dicta, and written by judges with virtually a conflict of interest.  They’re 
professors themselves!’”). 
157
 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).  The professor in Weinstein alleged that his article co-authors and 
former university infringed his copyright. 
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articles and other intellectual property.”158  The following year Judge Posner reflected on 
the teacher exception in a lengthy aside in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,
159
 an opinion 
that considered copyright ownership of an instruction manual for school word processors 
prepared by two high school (not university) teachers. 
The authority for this conclusion [the teacher exception] was in fact scanty, . . . 
not because the merit of the exception was doubted, but because, on the contrary, 
virtually no one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright his 
writings. . . .  [T]he universal assumption and practice was that (in the absence of 
an explicit agreement as to who had the right to copyright) the right to copyright 
such writing belonged to the teacher rather than to the college or university.  
There were good reasons for the assumption.  A college or university does not 
supervise its faculty in the preparation of academic books and articles, and is 
poorly equipped to exploit their writings, whether through publication or 
otherwise. . . . 
The reasons for a presumption against finding academic writings to be 
work made for hire are as forceful today as they ever were. . . .  To a literalist of 
statutory interpretation, the conclusion that the [1976] Act abolished the 
exception may seem inescapable. . . .  But considering the havoc that such a 
conclusion would wreak in the settled practices of academic institutions, the lack 
of fit between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the conditions of 
academic production, and the absence of any indication that Congress meant to 
abolish the teacher exception, we might, if forced to decide the issue, conclude 
that the exception had survived the enactment of the 1976 Act.  A possible 
textual handle may be found in the words of section 201(b), . . . which appear to 
require not only that the work be a work for hire but that it have been prepared 
for the employer . . . .
160
 
¶45  Despite sweeping claims about academic tradition in Weinstein and Hays, two 
decades later the teacher exception’s very existence remains, in the words of one court 
that recently considered the issue, “a question unanswered and highly debated by the 
courts and intellectuals.”161  To begin with, both Weinstein and Hays predated the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Reid, which sought to clarify the meaning of “employee” 
and “employment” by looking to their definitions under the common law of agency.162  
As one professor observes, “the commentators are not unanimous, but there seems to be a 
clear, if reluctant, consensus that the work-for-hire rules sweep in most of the traditional 
output of teachers and university faculty.”163  Similarly, another commentator believes 
that literal application of the Act’s work for hire rules necessarily leads to the conclusion 
 
158
 Id. at 1094. 
159
 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
160
 Id. at 416–17. 
161
 Molinelli-Freytes v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.P.R. 2010); see also Kenneth D. 
Crews, Instructional Materials and “Works Made for Hire” at Universities: Policies and Strategic 
Management of Copyright Ownership, in THE CENTER FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 15, 19 
(2006) (“This possible [teacher] exception[] is simply too elusive for educators and universities to rely 
upon, with an assumption that it will clarify and resolve uncertainties in the law.”). 
162
 See supra text accompanying notes 134–36 
163
 Denicola, supra note 141, at 376. 
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that universities own faculty works, and in any event “literal application of those sections 
[§§ 101 (defining “work made for hire”) and 201(b)] seems to have harmed no one over 
the past three decades.”164 
¶46  Cases that expressly consider the exception are rare, although their frequency has 
increased in recent years.  As of this writing, five courts have done so since Hays in 1989, 
with divergent outcomes.
165
  In the first, Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Central 
School District, the Second Circuit considered the teacher exception in connection with 
tests, quizzes, and homework problems created by a high school teacher.
166
  The court 
distinguished teaching materials (including the plaintiff’s) that “were never explicitly 
prepared for publication” from “published articles by university professors.”167  It held 
the “‘academic tradition’ granting authors ownership of their own scholarly work is not 
pertinent” to the former; the apparent implication is that there is a teacher exception that 
applies to published articles by university professors.
168
  The second case, Pittsburg State 
University v. Kansas Board of Regents, considered the teacher exception in the context of 
a labor dispute between a state university board of regents and a union representing 
faculty at a public university.
169
  The dispute involved whether the Copyright Act’s work 
for hire rules preempted the parties’ right to negotiate the issue of intellectual property 
ownership.
170
  In considering whether the work for hire rules vest authorship of faculty-
created works in the employer and whether a teacher exception applies, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas found it is “far from clear that there is an absolute teacher exception.”171  
It held that whether the employer owns faculty-created intellectual property depends on 
whether a particular work falls within the scope of employment agency factors per 
Reid.
172
  The third case, Bosch v. Ball-Kell,
173
 an unreported 2006 decision from the 
Central District of Illinois, seemingly affirmed the teacher exception and reasoned it 






 Field, supra note 141, at 144. 
165
 The analysis in this Section focuses on the teacher exception; it does not include cases that 
considered whether the work for hire doctrine applies to higher education faculty work product but did not 
consider the teacher exception. See, e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 
1307 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding without discussion of the teacher exception that the work for hire rules 
vested initial ownership of a course outline in the employing college and not in the professor who created 
it). 
166
 363 F.3d 177, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2004). 
167




 122 P.3d 336 (Kan. 2005). 
170
 Id. at 338–39. 
171




 No. 03-1408, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62351 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2006). 
174
 In Bosch, a pathology professor sued two former faculty colleagues for infringing her copyright in 
various teaching materials (course syllabi and exam questions) by copying and distributing them to students 
without the plaintiff’s permission after she left her position at the university. Id. at *7.  The defendants 
raised the issue of work for hire as a defense, arguing that the university, not the plaintiff, owned the 
copyright in the materials because she created them while she was a university employee. Id. at *9.  The 
plaintiff countered that the teaching materials were “traditional academic copyrightable works owned by 
the creator” under the university’s intellectual property ownership policy. Id.  The court denied the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion on the issue of copyright ownership and in so doing appeared to 
hold that the teacher exception applied to the materials by citing the “compelling” logic in Weinstein and 
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¶47  The fourth case, Molinelli-Freytes v. University of Puerto Rico,175 offered the most 
comprehensive discussion of the exception by a court since Hays.  The plaintiffs, 
professors at the University of Puerto Rico, drafted a curricular proposal that they alleged 
the university infringed when it established a new graduate degree program.
176
  The court 
queried whether the proposal manuscript was a work for hire, and if so, whether the 
teacher exception applied.
177
  After canvassing the history and policies behind the 
exception, the court concluded it did not survive the 1976 amendments to the Act.
178
  The 
court reasoned that Congress’s failure to mention the teacher exception, both in the 
legislative history and in the language of the Act itself, “weighs heavily towards a finding 
that no ‘teacher exception’ remains in existence.”179  The court also found key policy 
justifications lacking.  It found passé the suggestion in Williams that universities had little 
reason to want ownership of faculty works:  “In an age of distance-learning and for-profit 
institutions of higher learning, universities stand to gain much by retaining ownership of 
certain works created by their employees.”180  The court further reasoned that the 
proliferation of university policies purporting to allow faculty authors to retain copyright 
ownership ameliorates concerns about undermining the academic tradition of professors 
owning the copyright in their works.
181
 
¶48  Most recently, in Roop v. Lincoln College182 the court deemed the exception 
inapplicable but did not foreclose the possibility of its existence to the extent its 
application is limited to works sufficiently academic in nature.  Decided shortly after 
Molinelli-Freytes, Roop involved a long-time instructor at Lincoln College whom the 
school asked to develop a new degree program curriculum.
183
  Following a dispute over 
her contract and educational qualifications, the instructor left the employ of the college 
and brought suit alleging, inter alia, that the school infringed her copyright by using the 
curriculum and materials she developed.
184
  The court found that under the work for hire 
doctrine, the university was the author of curriculum materials developed by the 
instructor because she created the materials within the scope of her employment.
185
  The 
court declined to expressly recognize the existence of the teacher exception despite being 
located in the Seventh Circuit, which after Weinstein, Hays, and Bosch would appear to 
be hospitable to the exception.  The court instead referred to a “potential” teacher 
exception, which it considered at some length but concluded was inapplicable because 
“the copyrighted curriculum materials [at issue] here [we]re not ‘academic writings’ akin 
 
Hays, and noting that the academic setting is unlike “the typical work for hire scenario” in which “the 
employer assigns and directs the topic, content, and purpose of the work.” Id. at *20.  Also central to the 
court’s reasoning was the fact that the plaintiff presented evidence indicating that the university’s 
intellectual property policy intended to exclude teaching materials from university ownership. Id. at *21. 
175
 792 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.P.R. 2010). 
176
 Id. at 165. 
177
 Id. at 165–66. 
178
 Id. at 172. 
179




 Id. at 172. 
182
 No. 09-cv-1051, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25670 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2011). 
183
 Id. at *1–2. 
184
 Id. at *6–8, *10. 
185
 Id. at *28. 
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to academic books or articles that a professor would typically submit for publication”;186 
rather, recalling Judge Posner’s language from Hays, the court reasoned that the plaintiff 
“create[d] the materials for [the] College.”187 
 
TABLE 1. TEACHER EXCEPTION DECISIONS AFTER HAYS AND REID 
  
Case Name Year Court Type of Work at Issue Teacher Exception Exists? 
Shaul 2004 2d Cir. 
High school quizzes, tests, 
and problems 
Not for works not explicitly prepared for publication; 




All works created by 
university faculty 
Probably no “absolute” teacher exception, but some faculty-
created works fall outside the scope of employment 
Bosch 2006 C.D. Ill. 
Course syllabi and exam 
questions 
Yes 
Molinelli-Freytes 2010 D.P.R. New curriculum proposal No 
Roop 2011 C.D. Ill. Curriculum materials 
Not for curriculum materials; 
Maybe for academic writings of the type that are typically 
published 
 
¶49  As Table 1 illustrates, rumors of the teacher exception’s death post-Reid are 
premature, at least regarding its application to scholarship.
188
  Indeed, three of the five 
opinions leave open the possibility that a teacher exception applies to scholarly articles.  
Nevertheless, the health and scope of the exception remain unclear.  One thing does seem 
clear:  the increasing frequency with which the exception has been invoked in recent 
years suggests the doctrine is bound to linger as academics claim individual ownership of 
their intellectual work product. 
3. The Effect of University Copyright Policies on Initial Ownership 
¶50  Many universities have intellectual property policies that purport to allocate 
copyright ownership of works created by employees, and some courts that have 
considered the teacher exception have expressed deference to such policies.
189
  
Nevertheless, as discussed above, under a literal application of the work made for hire 
rules, if the faculty member who creates the work is deemed to be a university employee 
and if the work is deemed to be within the scope of her employment, then the university 
is the author and copyright owner ab initio unless a teacher exception applies.
190
  This 
 
186
 Id. at *30. 
187
 Id. at *31. 
188
 In none of these five cases was the work at issue a scholarly article or book (with the possible 
exception of Pittsburgh State, which used a broad brush to address all faculty-created copyrighted works).  
Three of the five cases (Shaul, Bosch, and Roop), however, seemed to regard favorably the notion that a 
teacher exception applies to scholarship in higher education. 
189
 See, e.g., Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting, however, that the 
policy is “part of each professor’s contract with the University”); Molinelli-Freytes v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F. 
Supp. 2d 164, 172 (D.P.R. 2010); Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
190
 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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would seem to be the case regardless of how the university’s policy purports to allocate 
copyright ownership. 
¶51  Of course, employers and employees can, and often do, contract to reallocate 
copyright ownership to the employee for works created during the term and scope of the 
employment.
191
  Section 201(b) requires, however, that any such agreement between the 
employer and employee be in writing and signed by both parties
192—a requirement 
arguably not satisfied by the existence of a university policy absent a more traditional 
writing signed by both parties.
193
  Presumably to satisfy § 201(b)’s writing requirement, 
some schools require faculty to sign agreements concerning allocation of intellectual 
property rights and others expressly incorporate the intellectual property policy terms into 
their faculty employment agreements.
194
  Some schools, however, appear to rely on the 
existence of a copyright policy alone to stipulate faculty ownership.
195
 
¶52  Dubiety about the legal effect of university copyright policies notwithstanding, it 
seems universities themselves feel compelled to formally express their intentions about 
copyright ownership.  Most if not all U.S. universities now have policies addressing 
intellectual property ownership, and over the past two decades, most schools have 
adopted policies expressly disclaiming ownership of scholarly works.  A 1992 study of 
copyright policies at seventy major U.S. research universities revealed that at that time, 
sixteen had policies expressly disclaiming university ownership of faculty-authored 
scholarly articles.
196
  A follow-up study in 2002 surveying the same seventy universities 
 
191
 17 U.S.C § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the 




 See, e.g., Forasté v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74, 81 (D.R.I. 2003) (finding a university 
policy “patently inadequate” as a writing that vests copyright ownership in the employee under § 201(b), 
where the policy stated that “ownership of copyrightable property which results from performance of one’s 
University duties and activities will belong to the author or originator,” and no other writing or agreement 
existed between the university and the employee concerning copyright ownership); Llewellyn Joseph 
Gibbons, Tech Transfer: Everything (Patent) Is Never Quite Enough, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 843, 870–
72 (2010) (“University employment policies or handbooks and faculty senate resolutions do not divest a 
university of its copyright ownership if it is the legal author under the 1976 Copyright Act.  Nor will equity 
provide a remedy to the faculty member who detrimentally relies on these written policies for a transfer of 
copyright ownership in the absence of a signed writing. . . .  To reiterate, the best university copyright 
policies are those that carefully track the requirements of the 1976 Copyright Act.”). 
194
 In addition to agreements signed individually by the parties, some commentators suggest that 
collective bargaining agreements that incorporate the copyright policy terms and are signed by employers’ 
and employees’ agents would likely satisfy § 201(b)’s writing requirement. See Field, supra note 141, at 
140 n.114.  That conclusion seems less likely if the agreement does not include the express language of the 
transfer but rather incorporates the university policy by reference. See Manning v. Board of Trustees, 109 
F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (holding insufficient as a writing for purposes of § 201(b) a collective 
bargaining agreement and annual employment agreements that purportedly incorporated the community 
college’s copyright policy). 
195
 It is often not clear whether university copyright policies disclaiming ownership of faculty 
scholarship are intended to rebut the presumption of employer ownership under § 201(b) or to effect 
transfers of copyright ownership under §§ 201(d) and 204(a).  In all likelihood, most schools simply intend 
to formalize in writing the expectations of the university and its employees without regard to the Copyright 
Act’s technical requirements.  Adding a further layer of complexity is the question of whether prospective 
transfers of copyright ownership are enforceable.  In short, they probably are. See infra note 283. 
196
 Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay Between 
the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223, 262 (1992). 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 410
found that that number had risen to forty-nine.
197
  This Author has reviewed the copyright 
policies of the same schools.  While the policies vary substantially in clarity and 
specificity, it appears that all seventy universities now disclaim ownership of most 
faculty scholarship, although a handful appear to assume that ownership vests initially in 
the university, and purport to subsequently transfer copyright ownership to the faculty 
member who created the work.
198
  A former university general counsel suggested to this 
Author that one reason universities feel fairly secure in their position concerning the legal 
effect of these disclaimers is that the disclaimers are the opposite of the potentially more 
objectionable arrangement; here the policies are intended to waive rather than acquire 
rights.  That argument makes some sense, since the purpose underlying the § 102(b) and 
204(a) writing requirements is generally held to be the reduction of fraudulent or 
inadvertent transfers of copyright ownership.
199
  These are not usually major concerns 
with regard to university attempts to transfer their own purported interests via express, 
albeit general, policies.  Nevertheless, courts appear unwilling to find that a university 
policy expressly disclaiming copyright ownership creates a valid transfer if the policy 
falls short of the requirements for a written instrument.
200
  The following Section argues 
that university copyright disclaimer policies are best interpreted not as instruments 
intended to transfer copyright ownership per the requirements of §§ 102(b) or 204(a); 
rather they are best interpreted as defining the types of copyrighted works that are 
excluded from the scope of employment for work for hire purposes. 
 
197
 Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty Work, 7 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 275, 298 (2002). 
198
 Research on file with the Author.  The University of Michigan is one school that expressly takes the 
position that scholarly works of its faculty, including scholarly articles and textbooks, are created within the 
scope of employment and are therefore works made for hire owned by the university. UNIV. OF MICH. 
STANDARD PRACTICE GUIDE, Who Holds Copyright at or in Affiliation with the University of Michigan 1–3 
(Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://spg.umich.edu/pdf/601.28.pdf (providing that works authored by 
faculty “within the scope of their employment as part of or in connection with their teaching, research, or 
scholarship” typically include journal articles, scholarly papers, and textbooks).  The policy then purports 
to transfer copyright ownership to the faculty member who created the work less various rights retained by 
the university to use, preserve, archive, and host the work in an institutional repository. Id. at 1.  The 
copyright policy at Johns Hopkins University is an example of a fairly typical copyright disclaimer policy, 
providing that 
[c]opyright to, and royalty from, literary or scholarly works in tangible or electronic form 
(e.g., textbooks and other curricular materials, reference works, journal articles, novels, 
music, photographs, etc.) produced by faculty members as a part of their usual teaching, 
service, and research activities, and which do not result directly as a specified deliverable 
from projects funded in whole or in part by the University or a sponsored research agency 
shall belong to the faculty who prepared such works and may be assigned or retained by 
them.   
Intellectual Property Policy, JOHNS HOPKINS U. 3 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at  
http://jhuresearch.jhu.edu/JHU_Intellectual_Property_Policy.pdf. 
199
 See infra Part III.C; see also Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n., 805 F.2d 
663, 672 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[Section] 201(b) requires that an agreement altering the statutory [work for hire] 
presumption be both written and express.  In essence, this provision is a statute of frauds.”). 
200
 See, e.g., Forasté v. Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236–41 (D.R.I. 2003). 
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4. Copyright Ownership and Academic Freedom 
¶53  Ensuring academic freedom is a compelling reason to exempt scholarly articles 
from the work for hire rules.
201
  According to the influential 1940 Statement of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure agreed upon by the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP) and the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities, the “common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free 
exposition,” and “[a]cademic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both 
teaching and research.”202  University faculty, the Statement provides, are entitled to “full 
freedom in research and in the publication of the results” without subjection to 
institutional censorship.
203
  Vesting in universities the exclusive right to reproduce, 
publish, perform, display, and prepare derivative works based upon
204
 scholarly articles 
plainly conflicts with the principles of independence and noninterference at the heart of 
the Statement.
205
  One can imagine many scenarios in which this would present more 
than a theoretical conflict of interest:  for example, when a faculty member produces an 
article critical of or offensive to the university administration, a powerful alumnus, or a 
major donor.  Regardless of whether a school today would alter or submerge a scholarly 
article under such circumstances, it is troubling to imagine that it has the right to do so by 
default.  This is especially so because it is far from clear, and indeed appears increasingly 
doubtful, that faculty members have a constitutional right of academic freedom on which 





 See Packard, supra note 197, at 293 (“[A]cademic freedom is the natural justification for the teacher 
exception, and, in fact, frequently is cited by academics and universities as the basis for exempting 
traditional faculty writings from university copyright claims.”). 
202
 Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles and Interpretive Comments, 56 AAUP 
BULLETIN 323, 324 (1970), reprinted in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS 





 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011) (enumerating the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act). 
205
 Unsurprisingly, the AAUP shares this view.  See Statement on Copyright, in AM. ASS’N OF U. 
PROFESSORS, supra note 202, at 214–15 (“Were the institution to own the copyright in [traditional 
academic] works, under a work-made-for-hire theory, it would have the power, for example, to decide 
where the work is to be published, to edit and otherwise revise it, to prepare derivative works based on it 
(such as translations, abridgments, and literary, musical, or artistic variations), and indeed to censor and 
forbid dissemination of the work altogether.  Such powers, so deeply inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of academic freedom, cannot rest with the institution.”). 
206
 See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment 
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 987–88 (2009) (“The constitutional 
standard [of academic freedom], unlike the professional standard, applies to public colleges and universities 
only.  Faculty at public institutions may not have a constitutional right to participate in academic 
governance, but their speech on academic matters such as student academic standards has been granted 
constitutional protection by the Supreme Court. . . .  The Garcetti [v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006),] 
official-duty test now threatens to terminate all constitutional protection for . . . academic freedom 
generally.”) (footnotes omitted); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the First 
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 311–12 (1989) (“In the last decade, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
concerning academic freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the 
university itself—understood in its corporate capacity—largely to be free from government interference in 
the performance of core educational functions. . . .  Commentators steeped in the traditional notion of 
academic freedom—understood as the protection of the scholarly integrity of faculty from institutional 
interference—have expressed both surprise at this change in doctrine and concern that a university may 
have a constitutional right to violate an individual professor’s academic freedom.”). 
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¶54  The lynchpin of a well-tailored teacher exception, then, seems to be academic 
freedom.  That is, copyright ownership should vest in the scholar for any works for which 
“full freedom in research and in the publication of the results” or “freedom in the 
classroom” is crucial.  Adopting this broad standard would not provide certainty in every 
case.  Disputes involving faculty-produced software or involving educational materials 
developed by high school or elementary school teachers, for example, could present 
challenging questions about the scope of academic freedom.  At least, however, 
delineating the contours of a teacher exception around academic freedom principles 
would ensure that the exception encompasses anything that can reasonably be considered 
scholarship. 
¶55  As discussed above, however, doubt abounds as to whether the teacher exception 
survived the 1976 Act amendments at all.
207
  Is there a step in the work for hire analysis 
that affords courts an opportunity to take academic freedom into account?  The 1976 Act 
does require that any employee-created work deemed “for hire” be created within the 
scope of employment.
208
  Some courts and commentators argue, therefore, that under the 
1976 Act the need for a teacher exception to the work for hire rules is diminished because 
the scope of employment analysis permits courts to consider the unique context in which 
scholarship is created.
209
  This approach fits more comfortably within the established 
framework of the work for hire rules under the 1976 Act and shifts the focus of the 
inquiry from academic custom itself (scholars’ retention of copyright ownership) to the 
importance of independence in faculty research and publishing.  “Faculty members in 
colleges and universities,” as noted legal scholar and former AAUP president Ralph 
Fuchs observed, “are usually not employed to follow orders but to render instruction and 
to pursue inquiries in their fields of competence, largely free of supervision and direction 
 
207
 See supra text accompanying notes 152–64. 
208
 See supra text accompanying notes 139–141. 
209
 See Pittsburg State Univ. v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 122 P.3d 336, 346–47 (Kan. 2005) (“While it is far 
from clear that there is an absolute teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine[,] . . . whether any 
particular creative work of a faculty member constitutes work for hire will depend on whether the work 
meets the Restatement test [for scope of employment], i.e., whether it is the type of work the faculty 
member was hired to create; whether it was created substantially within the time and space limits of the 
job; and whether it was motivated by a purpose to serve the university employer.”); James B. Wadley & 
JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, Work-for-Hire and a New 
Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 431 (1999) (“Under the work-for-hire test structured 
by the Court in Reid, the [teacher] exception, if needed at all, may have lost its conventional ‘exception to 
the rule’ utility.  Since the analytical structure in Reid considers the nature of the particular work created 
within the context of the employment as critical to the inclusion decision, the most that can be expected 
from a recognized academic exception is that it might flag academic work as requiring further inquiry as 
compared to nonacademic work.”); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:71 (2011) (“While 
state law cannot alter the content of federal law, parties can contractually agree about the scope of 
employment, which in turn may dramatically impact on whether the work is for hire.  For example, while 
an academic would for all other purposes be regarded as an employee, the parties could agree that the 
academic’s duties did not extend to the writing of particular material, thereby permitting the academic to be 
the author of such material.  Such an approach does not conflict with federal law; rather, state law provides 
the facts (the scope of employment) upon which federal law is then applied. This approach of defining the 
scope of employment in a way so as to preserve for academics copyright in teaching materials they prepare 
at their own initiative is the correct way to mediate between the impulses behind the false teacher exception 
and the clear language of the statute.”); Crews, supra note 161, at 31 (2006) (recommending that university 
copyright policies “clearly define ‘works made for hire’ and the work that falls ‘within the scope of 
employment’”). 
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. . . .”210  This separation of the faculty member’s scholarly (as opposed to administrative) 
functions from the university is institutionalized, intentional, and hard-won in the history 
of higher education in the United States,
211
 and should be an important consideration in 
the scope of employment analysis. 
¶56  A scope of employment analysis that takes into account the intentions of the 
parties, the requirements of academic freedom, and the unique context in which 
scholarship is produced should lead to the conclusion that the faculty member, not the 
university, is the author of her scholarly articles.  It is important to keep in mind that 
“scope of employment” is a term of art.212  Lay notions of what professors do at their jobs 
are not dispositive.  Only if all three elements of the Restatement test are satisfied is a 
work created within the scope of employment.
213
  When interpreting the first factor of the 
Restatement’s scope of employment test (that is, whether the work is of the kind the 
employee was hired to perform), courts rely heavily on the employee’s job description 
and the employer’s degree of control over the works created.214  Publicly available job 
descriptions for “university professor” uniformly list scholarly publication as a central 
requirement of the job.
215
  The content of scholarship surely matters to schools when 
evaluating faculty for tenure or promotion and some commentators find this fact virtually 
dispositive on the question of whether scholarship falls within the scope of 
employment.
216
  This view, however, ignores the unique context in which scholarship is 
produced—context that may be taken into account when analyzing this factor of the 
scope of employment test.  The tenure and promotion standards do not focus on the 
production of works for university ownership.  They focus on publication, which results 
in increased esteem for the scholar and, by association, the university.  In other words, it 
is the act of publishing works of high academic standards that fulfills the tenure 
requirement, not the act of producing specific works for the university at its behest while 
in its employ.
217
  This distinction is apparent in the fact that schools frequently decide to 
 
210
 Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom—Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 431, 445 (1963). 
211
 See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE (1955); 
WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY (1955). 
212
 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (U.S. 1989). 
213
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).  Case law developed under the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, but another edition has been published. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006) (“An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work 
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control.  An 
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of 
conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”). 
214
 See City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.N.J. 1995). 
215
 See, e.g., Postsecondary Teachers, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2012–13 EDITION (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/education-training-and-library/postsecondary-teachers.htm; Marty Nemko, 
Professor: Executive Summary, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2007/12/19/professor-executive-summary; College 
Professor Job Description & Career Opportunities, JOBDESCRIPTIONS.NET, 
http://www.jobdescriptions.net/education/college-professor/ (last visited June 3, 2012). 
216
 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 141, at 599; Garon, supra note 137, at 152 (“For most tenure-track 
faculty positions, academic writing remains a requirement of the job.  Faculty members often receive 
mentoring by peers, secretarial and administrative support and sometimes receive stipends or other 
additional compensation.  As such, the academic writings are part of the employment because they are 
obligations undertaken in order for the faculty member to receive tenure.”). 
217
 As Judge Posner emphasized in Hays, § 201(b) indicates that works made for hire are those works 
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grant tenure to professors hired away from other institutions.  In such cases, the hiring 
institution bases its tenure decision at least in part on articles published while the faculty 
member was employed at prior institutions.  As for the level of control universities 
exercise, because of the academic freedom principle schools have little or no control over 
the content of scholarly articles.  Faculty are free to determine the subject matter and 
content of their scholarly articles.  Further, that schools engage in post hoc evaluation of 
scholarship for tenure and promotion review, sometimes years after publication, is itself 
evidence of the universities’ lack of creative control. 
¶57  Moreover, although university copyright policies intended to disclaim copyright 
ownership to the employee are perhaps insufficient to vest ownership in the employee,
218
 
the policies provide powerful evidence of the job requirements and of which works, if 
any, the parties intend to include within the scope of employment.  University copyright 
policies disclaiming ownership are best viewed not as attempts to legally assign copyright 
but rather as evidence that the job description includes only a requirement of 
publication—not production of scholarly works for university ownership.  This 
interpretation better harmonizes university copyright policies with the work for hire rules 
and effectuates the intentions and understandings of all parties.
219
 
¶58  In addition to academic freedom concerns, financial disincentives arguably exist for 
schools to bring scholarly production within the scope of employment.  If universities are 
deemed the authors of faculty scholarship, they could bear legal responsibility for the 
content of every article produced by every faculty member on its campus.
220
  Academics 
are threatened from time to time with defamation suits arising from statements made in 
their scholarship.
221
  Former University of Oregon General Counsel Melinda Grier 
 
prepared “for” the employer. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. Ill. 1988). 
218
 See supra Part III.B.3. 
219
 See 2 PATRY, supra note 209, § 5:71; see also Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 
2d 1297, 1307 (D. Colo. 1998) (referring to a school policy that defined faculty duties in order to help 
determine whether a course outline was created within the scope of a junior college professor’s 
employment).   
220
 Employers may be held liable for an employee’s defamatory writings under respondeat superior, 
although under what circumstances remains unclear. Compare Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & 
Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that an employer may be held liable for 
defamatory writings by an employee), with Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 
1370–74 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the First Amendment requires a 
stringent standard of “actual malice” to show defamation, and finding the facts insufficient to impute 
liability to the employer). 
221
 See, e.g., AMY GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME: THE NEW ERA OF CAMPUS LITIGATION 176–77 
(2009).  Gajda details a pair of cases involving defamation suits arising out of legal scholarship.  In 2005, a 
man whose court case was mentioned in an article about custody cases and domestic violence threatened to 
sue the article’s author, University of Oregon law professor Merle Weiner, for defamation. Id.  The 
University of Oregon “disclaimed any obligation to represent her in legal action arising from her 
publications.” Id. at 177.  In 1998, the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy published an article 
titled “The Critical Need for Law Reform to Regulate the Abusive Practices of Transnational Corporations: 
The Illustrative Case of Boise Cascade Corporation in Mexico’s Costa Grande and Elsewhere.” June M. 
Besek & Philippa S. Loengard, Maintaining the Integrity of Digital Archives, 31 COLOM. J.L. & ARTS 267, 
273 (2008).  Boise Cascade Corporation sent cease and desist letters to the authors and the journal 
withdrew the article, directed Lexis and Westlaw to terminate online access to it, and published an errata 
notice that the article “was not consistent with the [journal’s] editorial standards.” Id.  Interestingly, in this 
instance, the law professors successfully sued the journal for defamation as a result of the retraction, 
winning an apology, payment, and the return of copyright ownership in the article. Id.  In another example, 
a professor of women’s studies at the University of Rhode Island was forced to remove two articles she 
wrote about trafficking of women and children after the individuals accused in the articles of sex trafficking 
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pointed out to this Author that if universities are deemed the authors of scholarly articles, 
insurance companies could condition liability coverage on whether a university has 
sufficient procedures in place to screen articles for potentially libelous content prior to 
publication.  Although the Copyright Act permits parties to agree to situate ownership of 
a work made for hire in the employee rather than the employer,
222
 an attempt to do so 
might not relieve the university of liability because such an agreement merely transfers 
copyright ownership to the faculty member—it does not change the university’s status as 
the article’s author.223  Whether insurers would actually require screening of scholarship 
is an open question (they do not, presumably, require screening for other tort liability risk 
factors such as the physical coordination of university employees).
224
  What is clear is 
that most universities evince little desire to be the legal authors of scholarship, and have 




hired a law firm and threatened to sue. Id. at 274.  The university told the professor that the case “did not 
have merit,” but still refused to defend it due to the potential costs involved. Id. 
222
 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2011). 
223
 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 5.03[D][2] (“Under the above formulation [in § 201(b)] 
the parties may by agreement memorialized in writing vary the rights which would otherwise be owned by 
the employer, but they may not vary such person’s status as the ‘author’ of the work.  This distinction was 
intentional, and was made in order to prevent the parties from avoiding the legal consequences (other than 
the ownership of rights) which arise by reason of the status of a work as one made for hire.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
224
 Thanks to my colleague Merle Weiner for making this colorful point. 
225
 Note that determining the scope of employment for copyright ownership purposes presents a 
quandary for academic freedom.  If scholarship is found to be created within the scope of employment, then 
schools own the copyright, giving rise to the uncertainty and potential threats to academic freedom 
discussed above.  If, on the other hand, scholarship is found to be outside the professor’s scope of 
employment, professors at some public universities may be unable to avail themselves of laws that require 
states to defend public employees against tort claims arising from the performance of their professional 
duties.  This could leave a professor without state resources to defend against a defamation suit arising 
from the content of a scholarly work, potentially having a chilling effect on scholarship. See Merle H. 
Weiner, Publish and Perish: Lessons About Academic Freedom that Every Law Professor Should Know 19 
(2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  In her manuscript, Professor Weiner describes 
how she was threatened with a defamation lawsuit based on claims she made in a scholarly article. Id. at 3–
39.  She argues that because she is a professor at a public university (the University of Oregon), because 
publishing scholarship is a job requirement, and because her article was produced using substantial 
university resources, her article was therefore produced within the scope of her employment and the 
Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) compelled the state to defend her. Id. at 19–25 (citing the Oregon Tort 
Claims Act, which provides that “[t]he governing body of any public body shall defend, save harmless and 
indemnify any of its officers, employees and agents, whether elective or appointive, against any tort claim 
or demand, whether groundless or otherwise, arising out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the 
performance of duty”).  The state declined to defend her. Id. at 24 (“So, what happened to my claim for 
coverage?  Absolutely nothing.  Despite the language in the statute that the Attorney General ‘shall defend’ 
pending a determination of coverage, the Attorney General’s office took the position that it had a 
reasonable amount of time to decide whether or not to cover me and no interim obligation to defend 
arose.”).  This quandary is ultimately rooted in the Supreme Court’s application of tort doctrine to the 
copyright context. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).  Scholarship is a 
prime example of a kind of work for which it might make sense to consider authored by the employee for 
copyright purposes but created “in the performance of duty” for purposes of triggering the institution or 
state’s duty to provide legal defense under statutes such as the OTCA.  (I say this bearing in mind the 
additional layer of complication, discussed above, that extending legal liability for defamation to an 
academic employer could have academic freedom implications.)  The current law, however, in which the 
authorship and tort liability standards are coterminous, appears to negate the possibility of different scope 
of employment standards for copyright and tort purposes.  For a discussion of some of the problems arising 
from the importation of tort rules to copyright’s work for hire doctrine see Jacob, supra note 156 (arguing 
that authorship under the work for hire doctrine should be decided according to copyright principles, such 
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¶59  Factor two of the Restatement test (whether the work is performed substantially 
within authorized work hours and space) is unlikely to significantly affect the scope of 
employment analysis in cases involving university scholarship.  As with many 
professions today, professors enjoy relative flexibility regarding when and where they 
work.  Even if many do the bulk of their writing away from the office or during evenings 
or on weekends, however, their work product might still be found to fall within the scope 
of employment.
226
  Nevertheless, this factor is seldom dispositive,
227
 indicating the 




¶60  Courts and commentators typically find that the third factor (whether the work was 
actuated at least in part to serve the employer) is satisfied if a desire to serve the master 
motivated the employee to any appreciable extent.
229
  This establishes a very low 
threshold; applying this standard, most works that are even tangentially related to the job 
may be “undertaken to serve the employer.”  Perhaps for that reason, not all courts have 
adopted this interpretation of “at least in part.”  Some look instead to the employee’s 
“primary” motivation for creating the work.  One court refused to find that a desire to 
serve his employer motivated an employee when the employee programmed software at 
his own initiative to automate job-related tasks.
230
  Although the software “benefitted 
 
as in which parties do the incentives to create the work lie, and considerations of public access to the work, 
rather than agency law rules aimed at determining when employers should be vicariously liable for their 
employees’ torts). 
226
 See, e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (D. Colo. 1998) 
(holding that a course outline created by plaintiff professor was within the scope of his employment with 
the college even though he “prepared the Outline on his own time with his own materials” because “there is 
no genuine dispute that Vanderhurst’s creation of the Outline was connected directly with the work for 
which was [sic] employed to do and was fairly and reasonably incidental to his employment” and “may be 
regarded fairly as one method of carrying out the objectives of his employment”). 
227
 Compare Cramer v. Crestar Fin. Corp., No. 94-2629, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25906, at *14 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 13, 1995) (finding that a computer program was created within the scope of employment even though 
the employee “wrote the [computer] program . . . substantially within the authorized time and space limits 
of his job—even if he did so at home, outside regular work hours, on his own initiative, and using his own 
equipment,” and observing that “[w]hen the first element of the Restatement test is met—that the work is of 
the kind the employee is hired to perform—‘courts have tended not to grant employees authorship rights 
solely on the basis that the work was done at home on off-hours’”) (quoting Avtec Sys. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 
568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994)), and Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding 
that a computer program written “at [the employee’s] home on his own time and for no additional pay” was 
nevertheless within the scope of employment based on the first and third Restatement factors), with City of 
Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that employee created the copyrighted work 
outside of authorized work hours, work held not to be within scope of employment as Restatement factors 
one and three also not satisfied), and Roeslin v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793, 798 (D.D.C. 1995) 
(finding computer program written primarily at home was created outside of authorized time and space 
limits and not within scope of employment as Restatement factors one and three also not satisfied).  See 
also Jacob, supra note 156, at 121 (“[C]ourts have reduced the importance of the second element and 
essentially have disregarded it altogether, establishing the scope of employment with only the first and third 
factors.”). 
228
 See Jacob, supra note 156, at 115–24. 
229
 See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 141, at 373 (“Although faculty research may be motivated primarily 
by a personal desire for knowledge, career advancement, or prestige, or by an altruistic desire to benefit 
others, it is sufficient under the Restatement if the purpose of serving the employer’s interests ‘actuates the 
servant to any appreciable extent.’”); Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8–9. 
230
 Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798; see also Jacob, supra note 156, at 123 (“[T]he third element is 
interpreted by some courts as emphasizing the employee’s motivation and not the outcome of her acts.  By 
so doing, the court can safely reach a conclusion that, even though the employer has benefited from the 
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[the] employer, and the Court could fairly infer that part of [the employee’s] motivation 
was to achieve this result,” the software fell outside the scope of employment because the 
employee “was primarily motivated by self-fulfilling purposes.”231  If one applies this 
higher standard, few would disagree that for most scholars, self-fulfilling purposes 
(including the desire to communicate ideas to peers, advance the state of knowledge, 
enhance personal esteem, and so on) are the primary motivations for writing scholarship, 
while a desire to serve the university “master” is at best secondary. 
¶61  Determining that faculty scholarship falls outside the scope of employment accords 
with the virtually unanimous understanding in the academic community that scholars 
own the copyright in their scholarship, as reflected in the express institutional policies of 
most major research universities in this country.  It also avoids rendering virtually every 
academic publisher a mass copyright infringer, since requesting a transfer of copyright 
from the scholar—not her institution—is the industry practice.232  Nevertheless, it is a 
double-edged sword with respect to academic freedom.  If the scope of employment 
analysis turns substantially on schools’ “voluntary” disclaimer of copyright ownership, 
the presumption is that schools have the power to redefine the scope of employment in 
the future and “reclaim” their status as legal authors.  Powerful justifications remain, 
therefore, for recognizing a blanket teacher exception for scholarship, bounded by the 
principle of academic freedom.  Most importantly for present purposes, however, is that 
whether a court employs the teacher exception or the scope of employment analysis, the 
legal and policy justifications for finding that faculty are the legal authors of their 
scholarly works are compelling. 
¶62  This position contrasts with a proposal by Professor Denicola, who argues that each 
university should embrace the work for hire rules, claim initial ownership of all scholarly 
articles produced by its faculty, and then, to preserve academic freedom, automatically 
transfer copyright ownership to the author less a limited nonexclusive license that the 
university would retain for itself to make the article publicly available for noncommercial 
purposes.
233
  The proposal is attractive for its legal elegance, but is unlikely to receive 
broad support in the academic community and raises academic freedom concerns.  The 
proposal cuts against the widely held expectation among academics that they are the legal 
authors of their scholarship, and it is likely to prove far more difficult to persuade 
academics to accept universities’ unilateral claim of authorship and subsequent transfer 
of most rights to faculty members—well intentioned though it may be—than to bind 
themselves to an open access mandate that allows them to retain copyright authorship and 
ownership.  Furthermore, as discussed above, a strong argument can be made that most 
 
activity, the employee was not motivated by the employer’s benefit and therefore the third element’s 
requirements were not met.”). 
231
 Id. (emphasis added). 
232
 One could argue that if universities are deemed to be the copyright owners of scholarly articles under 
the work for hire rules the publishers would be immune from infringement liability under the theory that 
universities, by acquiescing historically to publishers’ use and exploitation of scholarly articles, have 
granted publishers an implied nonexclusive license.  Even in that case the results are equally undesirable 
for publishers.  Holding a mere nonexclusive license, the publishers would have no recourse against 
universities, authors, or even third parties who reproduce the works or disseminate them freely online. 
233
 Denicola, supra note 141, at 379–82.  The University of Michigan has adopted this approach, more 
or less, although it permits faculty to control the timing and scope of access to their scholarship once the 
university places the works in its digital repository. See UNIV. OF MICH. STANDARD PRACTICE GUIDE, supra 
note 198, at 1. 
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scholarship is created outside of the scope of employment for work for hire purposes.  
Most importantly, Professor Denicola’s proposal raises the same academic freedom 
concerns discussed above in relation to the scope of employment analysis.  Vesting in the 
university legal authorship of scholarship, and the associated legal control, is repugnant 
to academic freedom principles even if universities are presently inclined to transfer most 
rights in scholarship back to faculty as Professor Denicola recommends.  As Professor 
Weiner counsels from experience, “never assume that academic institutions—either for 
whom you work or with whom you publish—care about academic freedom.”234 
C. Priority of Nonexclusive Licenses over Conflicting Transfers of 
Copyright Ownership 
¶63  This Part examines the copyright rules governing nonexclusive licenses, which are 
the primary form of public access permission, and therefore occupy a central role in open 
access.  Because copyright in the United States attaches immediately and automatically at 
the moment of a work’s creation so long as the work is sufficiently original and fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression for longer than a transitory duration,
235
 any attempt to 
make the work freely accessible to the public has copyright implications.  Even when an 
author intends to release a work to the public free of cost, he often retains certain interests 
in the work.
236
  An author who wishes to make the work freely available but only under 
specified conditions might, for example, grant the public certain permissions vis à vis the 
work under a standardized “open content” license such as a Creative Commons 
license.
237
  The terms of the license, as determined by the author, might grant the public a 
nonexclusive license to make noncommercial uses of the work or require that any uses of 
the work attribute ownership and origination to the author.  If the author wished to 
enforce these restrictions, she would have to rely on rights in the work that are senior to 
those of the subsequent user, and those rights would originate in copyright. 
¶64  The situation naturally is more complex when a person other than the author has a 
claim to copyright ownership—including any exclusive right—in the work.238  This often 
arises when an author has made a preprint of an article available in her university or other 
open access repository but aims to publish the article in a scholarly journal.  Journals 
typically require the author to transfer the entire copyright in the work.  If the author 
decides to make a preprint publicly available, subsequent transfer of the article’s 
copyright to a publisher can raise doubts about the status of the public access permissions 
attached to the draft. 
¶65  Typically, when an author posts a work online in a way that invites others to 
download, view, reproduce, or redistribute it, the author is granting the world an express 
or implied nonexclusive license to reproduce and distribute the work.  Nonexclusive 
licenses, therefore, are the lifeblood of open access.  Many online scholarship repositories 
 
234
 Weiner, supra note 225, at 3.  Permission mandates raise far fewer academic freedom concerns as 
they involve only nonexclusive licenses, not copyright ownership. 
235
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011).  
236
 See generally Loren, supra note 112. 
237
 See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org (last visited June 3, 2012). 
238
 The Copyright Act defines “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive 
license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive 
rights comprised in a copyright . . . but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
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require the author to grant the archive and its users a nonexclusive license as a condition 
of posting the work.  For example, arXiv.org, a popular open access repository for 
scholarly articles in disciplines including physics, mathematics, computer science, 
quantitative biology, and statistics, requires submitting authors to agree to either license 
the work to the site and its users under one of two Creative Commons licenses or simply 
grant the site a “perpetual, non-exclusive license” as part of the site’s terms of service.239  
Indeed, arXiv.org warns that submitters should 
take care to upload an article only if they are certain that they will not later wish 
to publish it in a journal that prohibits prior distribution on an e-print server.  
arXiv will not remove an announced article to comply with such a journal 
policy—the license granted on submission is irrevocable.240 
¶66  What is the status of these prior-existing nonexclusive licenses after the author has 
transferred copyright ownership to a publisher?
241
  Put another way, what rights do 
universities have to archive and distribute a work initially distributed freely under a 
nonexclusive license granted by the author but later subject to a transfer of copyright 
ownership?  The Copyright Act says relatively little about nonexclusive licenses, but it 
does provide for this scenario with some specificity.  Although the Act requires a written 
instrument signed by the transferor to effect a valid transfer of copyright ownership,
242
 
the statute is silent about whether a writing is required to validate the grant of a 
nonexclusive license.  Courts interpret the omission to mean that a nonexclusive license 
can be implied or oral; thus, a signed writing is not required to effectuate a nonexclusive 
license.
243
  Section 205(e) does, however, provide that a nonexclusive license 
memorialized in a signed writing “prevails over a conflicting transfer of copyright 
ownership.”244  In other words, any subsequent transfer of copyright ownership 
(including transfer of a conflicting exclusive right) destroys the permissions created by 
the earlier nonexclusive license unless a signed writing perfected the license.
245
  This is 
 
239
 Non-exclusive License to Distribute, ARXIV.ORG, http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-
distrib/1.0/license.html (last visited June 3, 2012); see also arXiv License Information, ARXIV.ORG, 
http://arxiv.org/help/license (last visited June 3, 2012). 
240
 arXiv License Information, supra note 239. 
241
 Note that this issue would not affect all open access articles posted online.  Some authors post their 
articles and grant a public nonexclusive license and never subsequently transfer copyright ownership in the 
article because either the author never publishes it in a journal or journal policy does not require the author 
to transfer ownership. 
242
 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2011). 
243
 See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
244
 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2011).  Section 205(e) provides: 
A nonexclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of 
copyright ownership if the license is evidenced by a written instrument signed by the 
owner of the rights licensed or such owner’s duly authorized agent, and if— 
(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or 
(2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and 
without notice of it. 
Id. 
245
 Section 205(e) is ambiguous in that it states conditions under which a nonexclusive license will 
prevail over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership, but does not expressly provide that a 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 420
true even if the grantor of an oral nonexclusive license intended it to be perpetual and 
irrevocable. 
¶67  The Act does not specify what constitutes a satisfactory writing for the purposes of 
§ 205(e), and to date no court has considered the issue.
246
 A court faced with the issue 
will likely look to sufficiency criteria for writings in the context of transfers of copyright 
ownership under § 204(a), where case law is abundant.  Section 204(a) requires that any 
transfer of copyright ownership (a concept that includes the grant of any exclusive 
copyright license but excludes nonexclusive licenses)
247
 be memorialized in a written 
“instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, . . . signed by the 
owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”248  Courts and 
commentators analogize the writing requirement to state statutes of frauds because it 
performs similar evidentiary and cautionary functions:  it aims to reduce fraud and 
inadvertent transfers of ownership by ensuring that no transfer of ownership can occur 
without a written record evidencing it; it also forces the parties to consider the terms of 
the transaction more clearly in order to reduce it to writing and impresses upon them the 
significance of the transaction.
249
  In these ways, “section 204 enhances predictability and 
certainty of copyright ownership—‘Congress’ paramount goal’ when it revised the Act in 
1976.”250 
¶68  Some courts, when considering the sufficiency of writings in the context of 
transferring copyright ownership, emphasize effectuating the intent of the parties over 
adherence to any specific set of formalities in the writing.
251
  Naturally, a written transfer 
agreement signed by the transferor that unambiguously provides the essential terms—the 
identities of the parties, the works at issue, and the scope of the rights transferred—would 
suffice.  Short of an unambiguous express written agreement or memorandum, courts 
vary somewhat on the level of specificity they require—for example, the extent to which 
essential terms must be unambiguously provided for in the writing.
252
  Courts generally 
 
nonexclusive license will prevail under the stated conditions only.  According to the legislative history, 
however, the provision was specifically intended to “require a nonexclusive license to be in writing and 
signed by the copyright owner before it can be given priority over a conflicting transfer.” H.R. REP. NO. 
90-83, at 96 (1967) (emphasis added). 
246
 As of this writing, only one opinion has addressed the question of the sufficiency of a written 
instrument memorializing the prior grant of a nonexclusive license under § 205(e).  In that case, however, 
the form of the writing—a payment receipt signed by an alleged representative of the author—was 
inconsequential because the court refused to find the alleged nonexclusive license existed because it was 
predated by the author’s transfer of copyright to the plaintiff, and in any event the court found the 
defendant’s testimony concerning the very existence of the nonexclusive license to be “unbelievable.” Ice 
Music Ltd. v. Schuler, 1996 WL 474192, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y 1996). 
247
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).  
248
 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2011). 
249
 See Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. Cal. 1990); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 153, § 10.03[A][2]; 2 PATRY, supra note 209, § 5:106. 
250
 Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557. 
251
 The Copyright Act provides that a “note or memorandum of the transfer”—presumably 
memorializing a prior oral agreement to transfer—will also suffice. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2011); 3 NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][2]. 
252
 Compare Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding 
insufficient as a signed writing an unsigned, undated document referencing royalty payments combined 
with a recording agreement that “makes no mention of any transfer of ownership rights in the musical 
compositions” and contains “no provisions transferring to plaintiff any of the rights to reproduce, perform, 
distribute, market, promote, or otherwise exploit the compositions”), with SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 
578 F.3d 1201, 1212–13 (10th Cir. Utah 2009) (“[W]hen it is clear that the parties contemplated that 
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look to see that the writing is sufficient to memorialize an agreement intending to transfer 
copyright ownership and is not so vague that the intent of the parties is unclear.
253
  Of 
particular relevance, in Forasté v. Brown University, the court held a university policy 
purporting to vest in the employee (a university staff photographer) “ownership of 
copyrightable property [] result[ing] from performance of one’s University duties and 
activities”254 insufficient as a writing for purposes of § 204(a).  The policy, the court 
observed, “fails to make any reference at all to the subject matter of the rights to be 
transferred, the recipient of the transferred rights, the timing of the transfer, or any other 
particulars of the deal.”255 
¶69  Patry argues in his copyright treatise that it is misguided to focus on the parties’ 
intent when determining whether a writing is sufficient to evidence a transfer of 
copyright ownership under § 204(a).
256
  Rather, the provision’s underlying purpose of 
“protect[ing] authors from those claiming, contrary to the authors’ view of the facts, that 
he or she transferred rights in the work” necessitates that the sole inquiry be whether the 
formal statutory writing requirements are met, construing any ambiguity or insufficiency 
in the writing in favor of the author or present copyright owner.
257
 
¶70  Just as courts refer to the purposes underlying § 204(a) when interpreting the 
sufficiency of a writing under that section of the statute,
258
 it makes sense to evaluate 
writings under § 205(e) in light of the section’s purposes.  Sections 204(a) and 205(e) 
address somewhat different concerns, however.  Section 204(a) aims to protect against 
fraudulent or inadvertent transfers of copyright ownership.  Section 205(e), on the other 
hand, governs priority of nonexclusive licenses over subsequent conflicting transfers of 
copyright ownership, and thus seeks to clarify the interests of nonexclusive licensees 
versus copyright transferees.  Congress adopted § 205(e) ostensibly to protect purchasers 
of expensive exclusive rights in commercially valuable works against unknown prior 
nonexclusive licenses that could diminish or destroy the value of the later-acquired 
exclusive right.
259
  The motion picture industry lobbied for a rule that would have given 
priority to only those earlier nonexclusive licenses that were recorded, ensuring that 
purchasers of exclusive motion picture rights would have adequate notice of any 
preexisting nonexclusive licenses.
260
  Legislators expressed concern, however, about the 
 
copyrights transfer, we do not think that a linguistic ambiguity concerning which particular copyrights 
transferred creates an insuperable barrier invalidating the transaction.”). 
253
 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][1]. 
254
 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D.R.I. 2003). 
255
 Id. at 240. 
256




 See, e.g., Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Section 204(a) 
is analogous to a statute of frauds . . . as its purpose ‘is to protect copyright holders from persons 
mistakenly or fraudulently claiming oral licenses.’  Thus, it is appropriate to borrow the requirements 
necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds to determine whether a given document satisfies.” (citations 
omitted)). 
259
 See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6385 Before 
Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1035 (1966); H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 199–
200 (1967). 
260
 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976) (“Under subsection (f) [now (e)] of section 205, a 
nonexclusive license in writing and signed, whether recorded or not, would be valid against a later transfer, 
and would also prevail as against a prior unrecorded transfer if taken in good faith and without notice.  
Objections were raised by motion picture producers, particularly to the provision allowing unrecorded 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 422
administrative burden that would result from a rule requiring the recordation of 
nonexclusive licenses.
261
  The Register of Copyrights recommended a rule that every 
nonexclusive license prevails over a subsequent transfer of copyright ownership, 
requiring neither that nonexclusive licenses be recorded nor that they be in writing.
262
  
Congress ultimately split the difference, providing that a prior nonexclusive license in 
writing prevails over a subsequent transfer of copyright ownership but that the license 
need not be recorded.
263
  It appears, therefore, that Congress intended writings under 
§ 205(e) to provide subsequent transferees with some measure of notice and evidence of 
the prior nonexclusive license’s existence.264 
¶71  The upshot for open access is that online repositories that require submitting 
authors to grant an express, written nonexclusive license to reproduce and distribute the 
article should be able to rely on those licenses even after the author transfers copyright 
ownership to a publisher.  Repositories often do require authors to fill out an electronic 
form with the author’s name and the title of the article, and to click a button indicating 
agreement with the site’s terms of service, which specify the scope of the copyright 
license being granted to the site.
265
  These elements form the essential terms of the license 
and the fact that the grant and “signature” are in electronic form seems unlikely to render 
the licenses unsatisfactory as “writings.”266  Schools that host and distribute faculty 
scholarship are well advised to require the author to complete such an online form and 
expressly assent to the grant of a nonexclusive license by clicking “upload” or “submit.”  
Alternatively (or additionally), schools can follow Harvard’s lead and request that faculty 
sign paper licenses to satisfy the requirements of § 205(e).  Many scholars also request 
that publishers sign an author-proposed addendum to the publisher’s standard publication 
agreement.
267
  The addendum expressly acknowledges the prior nonexclusive license 
granted to the institution, identifies the work and the author, and bears the author’s 
signature; it therefore usually should be a writing sufficient to memorialize the 
nonexclusive license for purposes of § 205(e). 
 
nonexclusive licenses to prevail over subsequent transfers, on the ground that a nonexclusive license can 
have drastic effects on the value of a copyright.  On the other hand, the impracticalities and burdens that 
would accompany any requirement of recordation of nonexclusive licenses outweigh the limited 




 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION 
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 97 (Comm. Print 1961). 
263
 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2011). 
264
 H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 96 (1967) (“The committee, while recognizing the practical problems of 
transferees in identifying and dealing with outstanding nonexclusive licenses, concluded that the 
impracticalities and burdens that would accompany any requirement of recordation of nonexclusive 
licenses outweigh the limited advantages of a statutory recordation system for them.  On the other hand, it 
accepted the proposal, advanced by producers of audiovisual materials, that subsection (f) [now (e)] in the 
1965 bill be amended to require a nonexclusive license to be in writing and signed by the copyright owner 
before it can be given priority over a conflicting transfer.”). 
265
 See, e.g., MICHAEL W. CARROLL, SPARC ET AL., COMPLYING WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH PUBLIC ACCESS POLICY: COPYRIGHT CONSIDERATIONS AND OPTIONS 10 (2008) (describing the 
NIH’s internet browser-based electronic manuscript submission process involving a “submission 
statement” expressly providing for the manuscript’s “public release,” to which the submitter assents by 
clicking “Agree”). 
266
 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][1]. 
267
 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
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¶72  A more challenging question is whether, in the absence of such an individual 
writing, a collective policy such as a permission mandate could initiate the grant of a 
nonexclusive license and constitute a sufficient writing for purposes of § 205(e).  If not, 
the subsequent transfer of copyright ownership would nullify the nonexclusive license 
that members of the public believe they hold, and in many cases, those licensees would 
not even be aware of the transfer.  Pervasive uncertainty about the status of permissions 
granted by many such licenses would result.  The next Part considers whether permission 
mandates effectuate the grant of nonexclusive licenses, and if so, whether those licenses 
are likely to survive a subsequent conflicting transfer of copyright ownership. 
IV. EVALUATING THE LEGAL EFFECT OF PERMISSION MANDATES:  
A CONTEXT-SENSITIVE APPROACH 
A. Do Permission Mandates Grant Universities Durable Nonexclusive Licenses? 
¶73  The permission mandate is attractive to open access proponents because it blends a 
powerful grant of rights with ingenious simplicity.  By its own terms, the policy upon 
enactment automatically and prospectively grants the university a broad nonexclusive 
license in each faculty member’s scholarly articles without requiring the faculty or the 
university to comply with any further formalities.  The nonexclusive license purportedly 
covers all rights under copyright pertaining to scholarly articles, namely the rights to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, distribute copies, 
perform the work publicly, and display it publicly.
268
  The school thus receives maximum 
flexibility with which to archive, preserve, and distribute faculty scholarship at low 
administrative cost by making the mechanism for obtaining licenses for faulty 
scholarship practically and politically feasible. Obtaining a signed license from every 
faculty member at an institution would be challenging, to say the least.  Many faculty 
members simply find copyright agreements confusing, intimidating, or not worth their 
time.  Others may be unaware of, misunderstand, or disagree with open access principles, 
while others might be philosophically opposed to signing any grant of copyright rights to 
the university. 
¶74  Schools that resolve to enact an open access mandate should have clear 
expectations about what they intend it to accomplish.  Do they intend it to have the legal 
effect of reposing nonexclusive licenses in the university (as the language of most 
permission mandates suggests), or is it an aspirational statement in support of open access 
principles?  Some schools, including Harvard, appear to view the policy language as a 
“back-up” license, relying primarily on written licenses that provide the same 
nonexclusive license grant as the policy.
269
  As mentioned above, however, it is not 
always feasible to acquire a writing from every faculty member.  If schools rely on 
permission mandates for their legal effect, and if the terms of the mandate policy are 
somehow insufficient to effectuate the grant of nonexclusive licenses in scholarly articles 
from faculty to the university, then the university is exposed to copyright infringement 
 
268
 Harvard FAS Mandate, supra note 11; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011). 
269
 The NIH similarly views its general “federal purpose” licenses as a back-up, requiring all NIH 
grantees to grant an express “public access” license upon submission of the manuscript to PubMed Central 
and relying primarily on the public access license. See infra note 301 and accompanying text; CARROLL, 
supra note 265, at 5–7. 
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liability risk.  There are two possible sources of such risk:  the faculty member author if 
he retains copyright ownership, and a subsequent transferee of copyright ownership, 
namely a journal publisher.  The risk of litigation from the former seems slight.  It is 
plausible, however, that publishers would consider suing universities if publishers fear 
that open access mandates threaten their business model.
270
  That three large academic 
publishers have sued Georgia State University over the school’s practice of making 
scholarship available to students as “e-reserves” exemplifies publishers’ willingness to 
sue universities over a practice that threatens revenues.
271
  Academic journal publishers 
ardently oppose the NIH open access policy, and lobbied in support of a bill that would 
force the NIH to repeal the policy.
272
  These actions further exemplify publishers’ fear 
that open access would negatively affect their revenue streams.  If permission mandates 
propagate, publishers might attempt to discourage their spread by threatening one or 
more “mandate” schools with an infringement lawsuit.  If permission mandates remain an 
important strategy of the open access movement, the threat of copyright litigation over 
works released under such policies could chill the movement as university administrators 
worry about the litigation risks involved in adopting a mandate. 
¶75  As noted above,273 some “mandate schools,” including Harvard, reinforce the 
policy by seeking a signed license from each faculty member individually
274
 that 
duplicates the policy’s grant language.  The school can then rely on the signed licenses as 
durable grants of nonexclusive rights.  Nevertheless, most U.S. schools that have adopted 
open access mandates have opted for permission-style mandates, presumably in part 
because obtaining signed licenses from all, or even most, faculty members is usually not 
feasible even if it is prudent. 
¶76  For a school to rely on the nonexclusive licenses that a permission mandate 
purportedly grants, the policy must accomplish two things.  First, it must effect the grant 
of a prospective nonexclusive license for all future scholarly articles by faculty members.  
 
270
 One commercial publisher points out that “‘traditional’ publishers are far more concerned about the 
long-term impact of institutional repositories than the author-pays model.” Robinson, supra note 81, at 
1458. 
271
 See Katie Hafner, Publishers Sue Georgia State on Digital Reading Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
2008, at C2.  “E-reserving” is the digital analog of the traditional practice in universities by which faculty 
keep a physical copy of a book or article on library reserve for students, who can view it at their 
convenience but cannot remove the copy from the library.  Today, faculty often scan or download a copy of 
a book chapter or article and post it to a server where students can access it, which sometimes includes 
printing, downloading, or sharing a copy. See Andrew Richard Albanese, A Failure to Communicate: In a 
Lawsuit Against Georgia State University over E-reserves, Scholarly Publishing Faces a Defining Moment, 
PUBLISHERS WKLY., Jun. 14, 2010, at 26.  Publishing royalties displaced by the practice of e-reserving “‘is 
a significant enough revenue stream for publishers to be concerned about. . . .  The paperback and the 
permissions markets have eroded over time because of e-reserves and course management systems . . . .’” 
Id. (quoting the Executive Editor for Social Sciences and Humanities at Penn State University Press). 
272
 See Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R. 801, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Lawrence Lessig 
& Michael Eisen, John Conyers, It’s Time to Speak Up, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2009, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig-and-michael-eisen/john-conyers-its-time-
to_b_172536.html (citing a report that the bill was backed by publisher lobbying money); John Willinsky, 
The Publisher’s Pushback Against NIH’s Public Access and Scholarly Publishing Sustainability, PLOS 
BIOLOGY, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000030.  In 
2011, a new bill was introduced in Congress again seeking to repeal the NIH open access policy. See 
Research Works Act, H.R. 3699, 112th Cong. (2011). 
273
 See supra text accompanying notes 265–267.  
274
 The license might be in paper or electronic form. 
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Second, even if the policy effectuates such a grant, the licenses granted must be durable:  
they must be able to survive a conflicting subsequent transfer of copyright ownership
275
 
to a journal that agrees to publish the article.
276
  
1. Do Permission Mandates Effectuate Nonexclusive License Grants? 
¶77  To find the grant of a nonexclusive license effective, the terms “[a]s with any other 
license . . . should be reasonably clear.”277  Generally, the key question is whether the 
intent of the parties and essential terms of the license are evident enough to support 
finding a nonexclusive license.
278
 
¶78  One might conclude that the mandate policy on its own is insufficient to grant 
nonexclusive licenses.  Two essential terms for establishing a nonexclusive license—
identification of the parties and works involved—are arguably unacceptably vague.  
While the mandate adequately specifies the school as the licensee, the licensors are 
identified in far more general terms:  all faculty members of the school.
279
  Likewise, the 
policy fails to identify the specific works licensed.  Instead, it purports to encompass all 
scholarly articles written by faculty following adoption of the policy, with the exception 
of those for which the policy is waived upon request.
280
  The unorthodox waiver 
provision might cast further doubt on the clarity and precision of the grant:  is a grant 
illusory if any or all works purportedly covered by it can be exempted at any time by the 
grantor at will?  Most importantly, the structure of the permission mandate raises 
concerns about evidence of grantor intent.  By sweeping in an entire class of authors and 
works, the policy might appear more like a unilateral acquisition of rights by the 
institution than a voluntary grant by authors. 
¶79  In this Author’s view, however, permission mandates are adequate to evidence an 
affirmative grant of nonexclusive rights to the institution and to constitute a writing for 
the purposes of perfecting the licenses against conflicting subsequent transfers of 
copyright ownership.  While the grant language of permission mandates does not specify 
each grantor by name, there is no rule that it must.  The grant should simply reasonably 
identify the parties, and a compelling argument exists that it does.  The language clearly 
identifies the grantors as faculty members,
281
 and it is easy to determine who comprises 
the faculty at an institution.  Likewise, the permission mandate adequately identifies 
subject works as scholarly articles written by members of the institution’s faculty during 
their time on the faculty but after adoption of the policy.
282
  While the permission 
 
275
 Recall that under the Copyright Act the transfer of any exclusive right is considered a “transfer of 
copyright ownership.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
276
 See supra Part III.C (discussing § 205(e) of the Copyright Act). 
277
 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][7] (discussing criteria for finding the existence of 




 See Harvard FAS Mandate, supra note 11 (“Each Faculty member grants to the President and 







 Id.  The policy further limits the scope of covered works by excluding “any articles for which the 
Faculty member entered into an incompatible licensing or assignment agreement before the adoption of this 
policy.” Id.  Courts generally hold unenforceable for public policy reasons blanket provisions purporting to 
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mandate does not enumerate the specific works subject to the grant—by its own terms, 
the grant is prospective—that fact is unlikely to be material.  Such prospective grants are 
commonplace in the entertainment industry, for example, where music publishing 
companies routinely sign promising songwriters to deals in which the songwriter assigns 
copyright in any compositions that do not exist when the agreement is executed but are 
created later during the term of the agreement.
283
  In short, it is easy to ascertain with 
certainty which works are within the purview of the policy. 
¶80  As for the issue of grantor intent, the grantor’s intent may be inferred from the 
circumstances.  U.S. schools that adopt permission mandates typically do so by way of a 
faculty vote.  Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, for example, adopted its mandate 
by a unanimous vote of the faculty (that is, of those faculty present and voting).
284
  
Presumably, the faculty present and voting in favor of the policy are expressly assenting 
to the terms of the grant, but what of faculty not present, not voting, or voting in 
opposition?  Can properly enacted faculty legislation intended to bind the faculty as a 
whole constitute assent?  Because nonexclusive copyright licenses need not be in writing 
and do not involve the transfer of any exclusive rights,
285
 courts have developed a fairly 
liberal conception of nonexclusive licenses.  Courts have found that nonexclusive 
licenses may even be implied, as “consent given in the form of mere permission or lack 
of objection is also equivalent to a nonexclusive license.”286  For example, Internet search 
engines have an implied license to copy and display content posted on webpages if the 
website publisher fails to embed code in the webpage instructing search engines not to 
cache.
287
   One commentator suggests that by continuing to work under a university’s 
intellectual property policy that purports to transfer a copyright interest from the faculty 
member to the school, the faculty member “has acquiesced to a nonexclusive license for 
 
acquire rights in all future creations by an author or inventor, sometimes evocatively referring to such 
provisions as a “mortgage on a man’s brain.” Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 F. 697, 700 (C.C.D.N.J. 
1887).  However, in the patent context, university policies that prospectively transfer rights in all future 
works or inventions resulting from research performed at the university have been held to be sufficiently 
well-defined to avoid unenforceability under this rule. See St. John’s Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 
161–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Federal courts have consistently upheld the validity of patent-assignment 
obligations imposed on university students, faculty, and staff as a condition of their research activities at 
the university.  These patent-assignment provisions do not implicate all of a researcher’s future inventions 
‘in gross’; instead, . . . they apply to inventions derived from research performed while the researcher is at 
the university.”) (citations omitted). 
283
 Contractual Obligation Prods., LLC v. AMC Networks, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (calling prospective assignments of copyright “commonplace in the entertainment industry” and 
stating that they “have repeatedly been held enforceable in federal courts”); see also Gladys Music, Inc. v. 
Arch Music Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  While cases have held that “a copyright licensing 
agreement can assign only preexisting copyrights,” see, e.g., Recht v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studio, Inc., 
580 F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 (W.D. Wis. 2008), Professor Nimmer observes that that position appears to be 
“without substance.” 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][8].  Prospective grants of property 
interests are also well established in commercial law. See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2011–12 Official Text) 
(establishing the validity of security interests granted in after-acquired property). 
284
 Open Access, HARV. MAG., May–June 2008, at 61, available at http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2008/05-
pdfs/0508-61.pdf. 
285
 See supra notes 238–243 and accompanying text. 
286
 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Lowe v. Loud Records, 126 Fed. 
Appx. 545, 547 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Circumstances establishing permission, or even lack of objection, can 
establish a nonexclusive license.”) (citing Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775). 
287
 See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006). 
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use of the copyrighted work.”288  This argument seems especially forceful where, in the 
case of permission mandates, the faculty has adopted an express policy granting the 
school a nonexclusive license.  Moreover, many universities’ employment agreements 
have provisions to the effect that the “Faculty Member agrees . . . to adhere to and 
enforce all University policies and regulations in place from time to time,” incorporating 
the policy by reference.
289
  In short, it appears there are ample grounds on which to 
conclude that a faculty member at a permission mandate school acquiesces to the grant of 
a nonexclusive license.  This conclusion seems inescapable where a permission mandate 
includes a waiver or opt-out provision such as that of the Harvard mandate, and the 
faculty member fails to object to the license by seeking a waiver.
290
 
2. Do Permission Mandates Satisfy § 205(e)’s Writing Requirement? 
¶81  If permission mandates do effectuate the grant of nonexclusive licenses in scholarly 
articles, as this Article argues they do, will those licenses survive after authors transfer 
their articles’ copyright ownership to publishers?  As discussed above, § 205(e) provides 
that a nonexclusive license will prevail over a subsequent transfer of copyright ownership 
if the license is evidenced in a writing signed by the licensor.
291
  The question still 
remains, however, whether the existence of a permission mandate constitutes a “written 
instrument” for the purposes of § 205(e). 
¶82  When determining the sufficiency of written instruments under § 204(a), which 
governs transfers of copyright ownership, courts and commentators typically refer to the 
purposes underlying the writing requirement.
292
  Courts considering the sufficiency of a 
writing for purposes of § 205(e) should similarly consider Congress’ apparent intentions 
behind § 205(e)’s writing requirement:  the writing enhances certainty and reduces risk to 
subsequent copyright transferees by providing tangible evidence and potential notice of 
the nonexclusive license.
293
  Permission mandates provide an unambiguous record of the 
license and its terms, and potentially provide actual notice to prospective copyright 
transferees (that is, academic publishers) that articles authored by any faculty member 
covered by the policy are subject to a nonexclusive license.
294
  Permission mandates are 
 
288
 Gibbons, supra note 193, at 869. 
289
 See, e.g., Employment Agreements, VILLANOVA U., 
http://www.villanova.edu/vpaa/office/facultyservices/guidelines/handbook/recruitment/agreements.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  Note that this language is quoted as an example of provisions in faculty 
employment agreements that incorporate university policies by reference.  Villanova University does not 
have a permission mandate in place at the time of this writing. 
290
 A faculty member’s failure to object to the license by seeking a waiver of the policy should be 
construed as acquiescence.  For a discussion about whether this result unduly encroaches on the author’s 
autonomy interests, see Part IV.B.1, infra. 
291
 See supra Part III.C.  
292
 See supra text accompanying notes 249–258. 
293
 See supra text accompanying notes 259–263. 
294
 Academic publishers are, unsurprisingly, well aware of Harvard’s permission mandate. See Mary 
Minow, Open Access to Scholarship, Part I: A Conversation with Michelle Pearse, COPYRIGHT & FAIR 
USE (Dec. 30, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://fairuse.stanford.edu/blog/2010/12/open-access-to-scholarship-
par.html (“Most of the larger publishers of the peer-reviewed journals are already aware of [Harvard’s open 
access] policy, and some have started asking their authors to show proof that they have submitted 
waivers.”) (quoting Michelle Pearse, Research Librarian for Open Access Initiatives and Scholarly 
Communication at Harvard Law School).  As a practical matter, a publisher arguing that any nonexclusive 
license the university may hold by virtue of the mandate has been voided for failure to satisfy the signed 
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publicly available on university websites and are often publicized in press releases and 
news stories.  They provide, therefore, far better notice to potential copyright transferees 
than would be the case if one merely complies with the minimum statutory requirements.  
A private writing between parties might satisfy the requirements of § 205(e) but might 
also be completely unknown to, and therefore provide no notice to, a subsequent 
transferee of copyright ownership. 
¶83  While permission mandates fulfill § 205(e)’s policy goals of providing evidence 
and potential notice of the license, they are not a traditional signed writing.  Nevertheless, 
it is reasonable to find that the permission mandates satisfy § 205(e)’s writing 
requirement in many instances.  Many universities expressly incorporate school policies 
into faculty employment agreements by reference.
295
  Where they do so, an argument can 
be made that the signed agreement incorporating policies by reference, including the 
open access policy, is a signed writing for purposes of § 205(e).  Even when a faculty 
employment agreement does not expressly incorporate university policies, it could 
impliedly incorporate them based on the university and faculty member’s mutual 
expectation of compliance with school policies.
296
  Although courts have been disinclined 
to find that a school copyright policy satisfies § 201(b)’s writing requirement (rebutting 
the presumption of employer ownership under the work for hire rules),
297
 those cases are 
generally inapposite.  Concerns underlying the writing requirements of §§ 201(b) and 
204(a) relating to inadvertent or fraudulent divestment of copyright ownership are 
 
writing requirement under § 205(e) would face a conundrum.  After all, journal publishers have sought 
copyright assignments from authors, not institutions.  Publishers would risk that a court would not 
recognize the teacher exception and deem scholarly articles to be created within the scope of employment 
for purposes of the work for hire doctrine (contrary to the opinion expressed in this Article). See supra Part 
III.B.4.  In that case, the universities own the copyright in scholarship.  Publishers’ chain of title would then 
rely on university copyright disclaimer policies.  As discussed above, however, courts have been reluctant 
to find that such policies satisfy § 201(b)’s requirement that presumptive employer ownership be rebutted 
by a writing signed by both parties. See supra note 193.  This would put the publisher in the difficult 
position of having to argue that its copyrights are valid because copyright disclaimer policies are sufficient 
writings to effect a transfer of copyright ownership from the institution to the author, but mandate policies 
are insufficient writings to enable the nonexclusive mandate license to prevail over the subsequent transfer 
of copyright ownership to the publisher. 
295
 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
296
 While cases considering whether employee handbooks are incorporated by reference into 
employment agreements typically consider the question from the perspective of whether the employer is 
bound by promises or representations in the handbook, the consensus seems to be that policies in 
handbooks may be incorporated. See Robert K. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of 
Law Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REV. 253, 264–65 (2003) (“A majority of states recognize that 
employers may be bound by specific promises in personnel handbooks, and some courts have incorporated 
the terms of handbooks even when there is an express disclaimer that the manual does not create 
enforceable rights.”) (footnote omitted); 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:10 (4th ed. 2011) (“Various 
rationales for finding that the terms of a[n employee] handbook were incorporated into an employment 
contract have been set forth in the cases.”). 
297
 See, e.g., Manning v. Board of Trustees, 109 F. Supp. 2d 976 (C.D. Ill. 2000).  The plaintiff in 
Manning, a community college staff photographer, claimed that the college’s copyright policy, which 
provided that “Members of the staff who develop materials . . . shall have complete copyrights to such 
materials,” constituted an agreement sufficient to overcome the presumption of employer ownership under 
§ 201(b). Id. at 978.  He argued that the policy satisfied § 201(b)’s signed writing requirement because the 
policy was incorporated by reference into his employment agreement. Id. at 980.  The court declined to 
decide whether the agreement incorporated the policy by reference, holding that even if it did that merely 
created an implied contract, which was unhelpful to the plaintiff because “[a]n agreement altering the 
statutory presumption under [§ 201(b) of] the Copyright Act must be express.” 
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inapplicable to § 205(e) and nonexclusive licenses.
298
  Moreover, permission mandates 
employ the language of an express license, as opposed to many university copyright 
policies that state general policy positions.  Lastly, the notice and documentation of the 
prior nonexclusive license that the policies provide adequately protect potential 
transferees of copyright ownership.  Finding that permission mandates satisfy § 205(e)’s 
writing requirement would not, therefore, unduly prejudice the copyright owner’s 
interests or divest her of ownership. 
¶84  Notably, the interpretation of permission mandates as sufficient writings for 
§ 205(e) purposes is consistent with how the federal government appears to treat “federal 
purpose” licenses.  The nonexclusive license grant in permission mandates mirrors 
established federal research grant policy, which vests in federal funding agencies “a 
royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use 
[any work developed under a grant] for Federal purposes, and to authorize others to do 
so.”299 While the terms and language of funding agreements can vary significantly by 
agency, agreements typically only incorporate the federal purpose license into the 
agreement by reference to the relevant federal regulation.  Because the university, and not 
the individual researcher or researchers, is typically the designated grantee,
300
 it is the 
university’s obligation to prospectively grant this federal purpose license for the work.301 
Universities can reasonably claim that each researcher (assuming faculty are the legal 
authors of their scholarship) grants the school an implied nonexclusive license to 
reproduce and distribute any scholarly articles resulting from the research, and authorize 
others to do the same, in exchange for access to the research funds.  Unsurprisingly, the 
NIH has taken the position that the nonexclusive federal purpose licenses it receives from 
grantee universities prevail over subsequent conflicting transfers of copyright 
ownership.
302
  If granting agencies can rely on a writing that satisfies § 205(e), then, it 
will typically be an agreement signed by the award grantee incorporating the regulation 
by reference. 
¶85  Lastly, it is worth pausing to consider a possible alternative interpretation of 
§ 205(e).  The language of § 205(e) is ambiguous:  it provides only that a nonexclusive 
license “prevails over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership if the license is 
 
298
 This interpretation of a sufficient writing under § 205(e) is consistent with the position that a general 
university copyright policy does not satisfy the writing requirements for purposes of § 204(a) (transfers of 
copyright ownership) or § 201(b) (rebutting the presumption of employer ownership of a work made for 
hire) given the substantially different rationales and concerns underlying the writing requirements in §§ 
204(a) and 201(b) (concerns about fraudulent and inadvertent divestment of copyright ownership) as 
compared with that of § 205(e) (notice to subsequent copyright transferees). See supra Parts III.B.3, III.C. 
299
 2 C.F.R. § 215.36 (2011). 
300
 See LEO F. BUSCHER, JR., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW ABOUT THE NCI GRANTS PROCESS BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 39 (2005). 
301
 See CARROLL, supra note 265, at 5.  Additionally, although the NIH maintains that it could rely on 
the federal purpose licenses alone to make these works publicly available, it nevertheless requires grantees 
to expressly grant a nonexclusive license when submitting the manuscript (the NIH’s “public access 
license”).  See id. at 5–7. 
302
 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REVISED POLICY ON ENHANCING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ARCHIVED 
PUBLICATIONS RESULTING FROM NIH-FUNDED RESEARCH, NOT-OD-05-022 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-05-022.html (“NIH does not need to seek permission 
from journals who may acquire copyrights from authors or institutions because any copyright transfer or 
assignment is currently subject to the government purpose license . . . .”). 
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evidenced by a written instrument signed by the owner.”303  Section 205(e) could 
therefore be interpreted as setting forth conditions that are sufficient but not necessary for 
a nonexclusive license to prevail over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership.  That 
is, if the nonexclusive license is memorialized in a signed writing then it prevails over a 
conflicting transfer of ownership; if the license is not in writing it may still survive a 
subsequent transfer of ownership if the nonexclusive license is deemed irrevocable under 
state law.
304
  Under this interpretation, the express grant of an irrevocable nonexclusive 
license (such as the licenses granted under permission mandates) could still prevail over a 
conflicting transfer of copyright ownership even in the absence of a signed writing.  
Alternatively, § 205(e) might be interpreted as having an implied negative, that is, 
a nonexclusive license does not prevail over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership 
if the license is not evidenced by a written instrument signed by the owner.  It appears 
from the legislative history that Congress intended the latter interpretation, as § 205(e) 
was meant to “require a nonexclusive license to be in writing and signed by the copyright 
owner before it can be given priority over a conflicting transfer.”305 
B. Taking into Account the Nonmarket Context of Scholarly Production 
1. Permission Mandates and Authorial Autonomy 
¶86  Even if a blanket policy such as a permission mandate can effectuate a license grant 
from a class of individuals (the faculty members at an institution), as I have argued above 
that it can, would such a grant unduly interfere with the author’s autonomy interests?  
This Section examines the notion of authorial autonomy in copyright and concludes that 
it would not. 
i) Analogy to the Google Books Settlement Agreement’s Opt-Out Structure 
¶87  The permission mandate’s opt-out structure is bound to raise concerns about 
authorial autonomy.  It is reminiscent of the opt-out scheme proposed in the recent 
Google Books settlement, which the court ultimately rejected in part due to concerns 
about the potential for the involuntary transfer of rights, even nonexclusive rights.
306
  
Google, as defendant in a class action copyright suit over its massive book digitization 
project, sought to use a proposed settlement agreement to acquire broad nonexclusive 
rights to reproduce and sell digital copies of all works owned by class members, which 
amounted to virtually every book subject to U.S. copyright law.
307
  While the settlement 
agreement ensured that copyright owners could at any time opt to exclude their works 
from the scope of the agreement and Google’s services, the agreement set as the default a 
 
303
 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2011).  In addition, the statute requires that the nonexclusive license “was taken 
before execution of the transfer” or “was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and without 
notice of it.” Id. 
304
 Professor Nimmer argues that a nonexclusive license must be backed by consideration to be 
irrevocable. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 153, § 10.03[A][8]. Contra 2 PATRY, supra note 209, 
§ 5:128 (arguing that the terms of a nonexclusive license, including whether or not the license is 
irrevocable, are determined by the parties’ intent regardless of the presence or lack of consideration). 
305
 H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 96 (1967) (emphasis added). 
306
 See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
307
 Id. at 675–77. 
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grant of rights to Google to copy and sell every book subject to the agreement unless told 
otherwise by the copyright owner.
308
  Google preferred the opt-out structure primarily 
because it afforded Google tacit consent to exploit millions of “orphan works,” that is, 
works still under copyright whose owners cannot be located through reasonably diligent 
search.
309
  Without the opt-out structure, Google would have been unable to acquire 
rights to include most orphan works in its services, but the structure would effectively 
transfer rights to Google without the copyright owner’s express consent or, in many 
cases, even knowledge.  In rejecting the settlement agreement, the court emphasized the 
sanctity of the copyright owner’s “right to exclude others from using his property,” 
calling it “fundamental and beyond dispute.”310  The copyright owner need not act to 
ensure he retains his rights; he is free to “sit back, do nothing and enjoy his property 
rights untrammeled by others exploiting his works without permission.”311  The court 
worried that due to the agreement’s opt-out structure, “if copyright owners sit back and 
do nothing, they lose their rights.  Absent class members who fail to opt out will be 
deemed to have released their rights even as to future infringing conduct.”312 
¶88  While there are significant differences between the Google Books settlement 
agreement and institutional permission mandates, both start from the default position that 
the grantee automatically acquires nonexclusive rights in works by virtue of the fact those 
works are owned by individuals in a specified class, unless and until the grantee is 
informed otherwise by the copyright owner.  And in both cases, the owner of a work 
subject to a nonexclusive license might not have been involved in drafting or negotiating 
the instrument or the policy, and indeed might not even be aware of the instrument or 
policy’s existence.  A court interpreting a permission mandate could well take the 
position that the permission mandate, like the Google Books settlement agreement, 
causes users to “lose their rights” by doing something entirely within their rights—that is, 
by doing nothing. 
¶89  In the Google Books settlement, however, there is no previously existing 





 Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 479, 495. 
310
 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 681. 
311
 Id. (quoting counsel for objector Amazon.com). 
312
 Id. (citation omitted).  The court also cited § 201(e) of the Copyright Act, which provides: 
When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual 
author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting 
to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the 
copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under 
this title . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2011).  The Authors Guild court noted there was some debate about whether this 
section was intended to apply to government seizure only or whether it includes actions of private parties 
such as Google, but found it unnecessary to decide the issue:  the mere “notion that a court-approved 
settlement agreement can release the copyright interests of individual rights owners who have not 
voluntarily consented to transfer is a troubling one.” Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 681.  While 
§ 201(e) arguably raises concerns in the context of a class action settlement of the sort in Authors Guild, it 
is unlikely to raise similar concerns where a university policy purports to initiate the grant of a 
nonexclusive right from its faculty in the context of a voluntary employment relationship.  In any event, 
§ 201(e) appears only to prohibit certain attempts to acquire or transfer exclusive, not nonexclusive, rights. 
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an orphan work and Google.  The relationship would have arisen solely from the fact that 
the copyright owner is a member of the class as determined by the court.  Scholarly 
articles present a different case.  The university has an employment relationship with the 
author, who is subject to university policies.  Moreover, it is important to recognize that 
universities have an interest in the management and dissemination of scholarship that 
they support, even if universities might not be the legal authors.
313
  As one commentator 
has argued, universities and scholars should not feel constrained by the work for hire 
rules’ binary, all-or-nothing allocation of copyright interests.314  Permission mandates are 
a tool by which universities and scholars can share rights, thereby recognizing the 
university’s limited interest in the work while respecting the faculty member’s authorship 
interests. 
¶90  Another difference between the Google Books settlement and permission mandates 
is the nature of the works and their proposed uses.  Authors are able to exploit books 
commercially.  Even the most obscure, out-of-print book has a potential market, at least 
theoretically.  That is not the case with scholarly articles.  No market exists for scholars 
to sell their articles individually:  no libraries purchase them individually from their 
authors, no publishers pay authors for them, and authors do not earn royalties from them 
when they are ultimately sold to libraries as parts of journals.
315
  Google and the 
permission mandate schools’ proposed uses are also dissimilar.  Google intends to 
commercially exploit the scanned books by selling online access to them and placing 
advertisements on their pages.
316
  Permission mandates, on the other hand, are not an 
attempt to acquire authors’ proprietary rights in scholarly articles—indeed, the licenses 
are limited to non-profit uses only.  Rather, the mandates are occurring within the broader 
context of the university as a commons,
317
 and can be understood as an effort to manage 
and disseminate the information contained in scholarly articles as a common resource 
vital to the scholarly community and the production of new knowledge. 
 
313
 See supra Part III.B. 
314
 Crews, supra note 161, at 23–25. 
315
 See supra text accompanying notes 126–127.  Technology is indeed catalyzing some changes in the 
market for scholarly articles.  For example, performing a general Google search for an article title or 
citation might produce a link to an online database such as LexisNexis or J-STOR, providing the option to 
purchase an individual electronic copy of the article, often in the range of ten to twenty dollars.  This might 
enable a new form of supplemental revenue for journal publishers and online databases, but authors are not 
partaking in the revenue (and indeed, why would they, as they typically no longer own any rights in the 
work after transferring ownership to the publisher).  Academic authors do not, at least for the time being, 
have realistic options for earning royalties from their scholarly articles.  Although new self-publishing 
platforms are emerging from which academics can sell scholarly articles directly to consumers, such as 
Amazon’s CreateSpace and Kindle Store and Apple’s iTunes Bookstore, it is unlikely that the market for 
most scholarly articles would be large enough to alter the general proposition that scholars do not write 
their scholarly articles for commercial exploitation. 
316
 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671. 
317
 See Michael J. Madison et al., The University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 J.L. & POL’Y 
365, 371 (2009). (“What constructed cultural commons share are member or participant contributions of 
information and knowledge resources to some distinguishable and bounded collectively managed 
enterprise, and the ability of those members to appropriate and build on those shared resources.”). 
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ii) Copyright Theory and Authorial Autonomy 
¶91  Nevertheless, authorial autonomy would still appear to be a formidable obstacle to 
validating opt-out licensing structures in light of Authors Guild (the Google Books 
decision).  It is therefore worth unpacking the notion of authorial autonomy in copyright. 
¶92  The theoretical literature recognizes two senses in which authorial autonomy is 
important to the U.S. copyright system.  The first is economic autonomy:  copyright law 
helps ensure the author’s autonomy from the state or other powerful influences by 
enabling authors to “look to the market, not government patronage, for financial 
sustenance.”318  This, in turn, enhances democratic discourse in society by promoting 
expressive diversity.
319
  The second sense in which autonomy is important to copyright is 
personal autonomy:  the property right afforded by copyright law protects the author’s 
ability to broadly control the creative products of his mind.  This derives from notions of 
individual freedom, self-determination, and human dignity—ultimately “‘self-rule,’ the 
ability to steer oneself according to one’s own plan and design.”320  Autonomy in this 
sense, therefore, speaks to freedom of action vis à vis one’s creative works—the right to 
determine how the works can be used and by whom.
321
  There is, of course, also an 
economic dimension to personal autonomy.  After all, the right to determine how one’s 
creative works are used includes the ability to alienate them at a price acceptable to the 
creator.
322
  In short, one might say that these two notions of autonomy in copyright boil 
down to the idea that copyright promotes freedom of thought and expression, on one 
hand, and freedom to act (or forbear from acting), on the other.
323
 
¶93  Economic autonomy—The economic autonomy afforded by copyright is 
nonessential and indeed largely irrelevant to scholarship.  Freedom of thought and 
expression is paramount to scholars and the academic community, to be sure.  However, 
in no way do scholars rely on copyright law or the market to ensure that freedom.  
Indeed, the academy employs a robust patronage model of knowledge and cultural 
production:  universities (and sometimes foundations and other granting institutions), and 
not the market, financially support scholars’ creative output.  Patronage, which was the 
primary form of livelihood for creative professionals before the institution of modern 
intellectual property systems, often trammels creativity because authors are beholden to 
the preferences and purposes of their patrons.
324
  To ensure they are not ideologically 
beholden to universities, therefore, scholars must rely on long-standing norms within the 
academic community, in particular the norm of academic freedom.
325
  Academic 
freedom, in turn, encompasses more than freedom from influence by the university or 
even the state; it also involves freedom from the market.  While the market has generally 
 
318
 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 81 (2008). Netanel calls this copyright’s 
“structural function” in underwriting free speech and democratic discourse. Id. 
319
 Id. at 38, 89–94.  
320
 MERGES, supra note 67, at 18. See generally id. at 68–101. 
321
 Id. at 72, 83. 
322
 Id. at 18, 81. 
323
 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) (implicitly 
recognizing both forms of autonomy, the Court noted that “[t]he author’s control of first public distribution 
implicates not only his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of 
prepublication rights, which are valuable in themselves”). 
324
 See MERGES, supra note 67, at 198. 
325
 See Packard, supra note 197, at 287–93. 
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enhanced authorial autonomy as compared with the alternative modes of information 
production (private or public patronage),
326
 it poses its own threats to autonomy and free 
thought.
327
  Salaries and research funding afforded by universities insulate scholars from 
the market, ensuring equal compensation whether their articles are contentious, esoteric, 
or have mass appeal.
328
  Commercial incentives therefore need not influence scholars, 
enabling them to freely write whatever they wish.  The model of scholarship production, 
then, is nonmarket not only because journals do not pay scholars for articles; it is by 
design.  In short, scholars rarely, if ever, need the economic autonomy afforded by 
copyright, and it might even be counterproductive for them to have that autonomy.  
Therefore, one should not object to the opt-out structure of permission mandates based on 
concerns that they encroach too deeply on faculty authors’ economic autonomy. 
¶94  Personal autonomy—Despite the economic orientation of U.S. copyright law, 
economic interests are not the only interests protected by copyright.  Various protections 
for personhood or dignity interests are scattered throughout the Copyright Act and 
relevant judicial opinions.
329
  In rejecting the Google Books settlement agreement, for 
example, Judge Chin seems as concerned about personal autonomy interests as economic 
autonomy interests, if not more so.
330
  Personal autonomy interests are more relevant to 
scholarship than economic autonomy interests; the justifications for recognizing 
personhood interests in works of creative expression—promotion and recognition of 
authorial freedom, dignity, and the author’s creative contributions331—all apply to 




¶95  Nevertheless, the open access mandate’s automatic grant of a nonexclusive license 
seems unlikely to unduly burden faculty members’ personhood interests in their scholarly 
articles.  First, the author’s interest in factual works, including most scholarly articles, is 
comparatively attenuated to begin with, as “[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need 
to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”333   Second, the economic 
aspect of personhood interests—the idea that the author should be free to economically 
exploit her work at a price and according to terms acceptable to her
334—is of little 
concern regarding scholarly articles.  There is presently no market for authors to sell 
individual scholarly articles since journals do not pay for them and libraries will only 
purchase them as part of a journal subscription.  This is in stark contrast to the books 
covered by the Google Books proposed settlement, which generally have a potential 
market and the opportunity to earn revenue for their authors.  Third, the “right” with 
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which academic authors are most concerned—attribution335—is not directly enforceable 
through copyright law since the Copyright Act provides no express right of attribution for 
literary works,
336
 nor does the law protect the ideas underlying an author’s specific 
expression.
337
  If one academic author uses another’s ideas without attribution, the 
originator will enforce her attribution interest through academic community norms, such 
as the condemnation of plagiarism, rather than copyright law.
338
  Lastly, the mandate has 
an effective built-in protection for the author’s personal autonomy interests—the faculty 
member has the power to exclude from the scope of the grant any work at any time for 
any reason.
339
  Even a permission mandate without this opt-out provision, however, 
probably would not unduly burden the scholar’s autonomy interests for the other reasons 
previously discussed. 
2. Reducing Open Access-Related Uniformity Costs Through Judicial Tailoring 
¶96  This Article previously outlined the concept of uniformity costs in intellectual 
property and showed how applying economic-centric copyright rules to scholarly articles, 
which result from a nonmarket model of information production, can produce uniformity 
costs including uncertainty about the allocation of copyright ownership and the potential 
to undermine community norms of academic freedom.
340
  It provided two examples of 
particular relevance to open access scholarship:  the work made for hire rules as applied 
to scholarly articles,
341
 and the writing requirement of § 205(e).
342
  As uniformity cost is 
“the central problem that intellectual property law must manage,”343 courts should seek to 
apply copyright rules in a context-sensitive manner that reduces uniformity costs.  Taking 
a context-sensitive approach, a court is more apt to uphold common understandings and 
expectations within the academic community and advance copyright’s underlying 
principles of promoting progress and disseminating knowledge by finding that 
scholarship is created outside the scope of a faculty member’s employment (or, 
alternatively, that a well-tailored teacher exception exists for scholarly articles),
344
 and by 
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¶97  Context-sensitive rule making and application of rules is the acknowledged remedy 
for uniformity costs.
345
  This “tailoring” of intellectual property laws to render them more 
context-sensitive and reduce uniformity costs can occur at both the legislative and 
judicial interpretation stages.  Tailoring at the legislative stage involves enacting statutory 
amendments that either grant additional rights or limit the scope of protection of rights 
available for certain classes of works.
346
  Judicial tailoring involves courts’ systematically 
different treatment of uniform rights and rules.
347
  Professors Burk and Lemley argue that 
in the patent law context it is often preferable to do this kind of tailoring in courts rather 
than the legislature for several reasons.  First, they express concerns about how statutory 
amendments aimed at particularizing rules for different industries might violate U.S. 
intellectual property treaty obligations.  Second, it is difficult to prescribe optimal, 
detailed rules for particular contexts in a statute.  Third, there are substantial 
administrative costs and uncertainties involved in writing industry-specific rules.  Fourth, 
statutes drafted with current technologies and conditions in mind rapidly become 
obsolete.  Lastly, each new amendment presents an opportunity for rent-seeking and 
special interest lobbying.
348
  Likewise, in the copyright context, Professor Carroll argues 
that judicial tailoring is often preferred as well.
349
 
¶98  Judicial tailoring is an appropriate remedy for uniformity costs that arise from 
applying economic-centric copyright rules to scholarly articles.
350
  Indeed, the teacher 
exception, to the limited extent courts have recognized it, is an attempt by judges to 
reduce uniformity costs by tailoring the law to exclude scholarship and lectures from 
work for hire rules that have no practical relevance to the production of scholarly 
articles.
351
  The history of the work for hire doctrine suggests that in fashioning those 
rules Congress had business and industry in mind—that is, commercial information 
production:  the script writer at the movie studio, the copy writer at the ad agency, the 
analyst drafting reports for the credit rating agency, and so on.
352
  By and large, the 
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“employees” Congress had in mind are individuals paid to create at the behest or 
direction of their employer works that directly or indirectly enhance the employer’s 
business function or profits.
353
  Given scholarship’s nonmarket production model,354 it is 
not the kind of work that Congress targeted with the work for hire rules. 
¶99  Carroll, Burk, and Lemley, in their discussion of judicial tailoring of uniformity 
costs, advocate working within the intellectual property doctrines and statutory 
provisions that feature flexible standards that provide room for judicial discretion.
355
  If a 
court is reluctant to find a teacher exception exists, the agency factors in Reid afford 
courts some discretion in application.  Courts would reduce uniformity costs by using that 
discretion to find that scholarship falls outside the scope of employment for the reasons 
noted above.
356
  It makes little sense for a court to find that scholarship is created within 
the scope of employment for copyright purposes when the justifications supporting the 
work for hire rules seem inapplicable to scholarship, universities do not control the 
content of the scholarship, most universities actively disclaim ownership of scholarship, 
and university ownership undermines principles of academic freedom.
357
  A 
determination that scholarly articles are not within the scope of employment for work for 
hire purposes, however, exemplifies a context-sensitive approach that upholds the 
socially valuable institution of academic freedom, aligns outcomes with the expectations 
of the relevant community (scholars, universities, and publishers), and thereby increases 
certainty about the allocation of entitlements. 
¶100  Likewise, when evaluating the legal effect of permission mandates, a court might 
adopt a more flexible view of signed writings for purposes of § 205(e).  Section 205(e)’s 
writing requirement developed to protect purchasers of expensive exclusive rights in 
commercially valuable works against unknown prior nonexclusive licenses, a concern 
pertinent to the entertainment industry that has little relevance to nonmarket production 
of scholarly articles.
358
  If permission mandate licenses are challenged based on their 
sufficiency as writings, courts should consider using their discretion to minimize 
uniformity costs, including uncertainty of entitlements and the resultant chilling effect on 
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research dissemination as researchers and universities increasingly come to rely on 
licenses effectuated by permission mandates.  Finding that permission mandates are 
satisfactory writings for purposes of § 205(e) is consistent with the objectives of § 205(e) 
of providing evidence of the license and notice to subsequent copyright transferees, and 
promotes the copyright goals of advancing and disseminating knowledge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶101  Open access proponents argue that scholars are far more likely to make their 
articles freely available online if they are required to do so by their university or funding 
institution.  Therefore, if the open access movement is to achieve anything close to its 
goal of seeing all scholarly articles freely available online, it seems that mandates of 
some sort will play a significant role.  Since 2008, a number of American universities 
have adopted policies that purport not only to require scholars to deposit their works in 
open access repositories, but also to grant the university nonexclusive copyright licenses 
in all works of faculty scholarship.  The principal aim of this Article has been to analyze 
the legal effect of “Harvard-style” open access permission mandates.  This required first 
analyzing whether scholars are the legal authors (and therefore initial owners) of their 
scholarly articles under the Copyright Act’s work made for hire rules.  It then required 
determining whether a permission mandate in fact vests, as its terms suggest, 
nonexclusive licenses in the university for all scholarly articles created by its faculty.  
Lastly, this analysis required determining whether those licenses survive after the faculty 
member who writes the article transfers copyright ownership to a publisher.  As the 
foregoing analysis shows, in the Author’s opinion the answer to all three of these 
questions is “yes”:  scholars should be deemed the authors of their works, and permission 
mandates create in universities effective, durable nonexclusive licenses to archive and 
distribute faculty scholarship and permit the university to license others to do the same. 
¶102  The implications of this analysis extend beyond permission mandates and open 
access, however.  The analysis highlights the poor fit between copyright rules developed 
with proprietary modes of information production in mind and the non-proprietary 
production of scholarly articles.  It is misguided to assume that the circumstances of 
scholarship’s creation and its role as a social information resource are the same as those 
of all other works of original expression.  Two observations follow from that statement.  
First, if the current copyright rules were forged under the assumption that information 
production is proprietary, then applying them to a class of works derived from a non-
proprietary production model in a community that particularly values that model can lead 
to uncertainty, upend expectations, and jeopardize important norms such as academic 
freedom.  These are social costs that courts should minimize where possible.  One 
example highlighted throughout this Article is the application of the work for hire rules to 
scholarly articles. The work for hire rules, which automatically vest in an employer 
authorship of any works created by an employee within the scope of employment, 
developed without regard to concerns about academic freedom or the peculiar 
circumstances in which scholarly articles are produced, which are decidedly different 
from those of commercial information production.  The work for hire rules should 
therefore be applied with sensitivity to academic community norms as reflected in the 
expectations of scholars and their institutions, particularly where those norms are 
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compatible with the important copyright objectives of promoting the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
¶103  Second, the analysis highlights that not all copyright licensing opt-out regimes are 
created equal.  The opt-out regime that Harvard-style permission mandates establish is 
not necessarily synonymous with the regime proposed in the Google Books settlement 
agreement, for example.  The latter targeted a class of works that possess revenue-earning 
potential for their authors and thus fit comfortably within the traditional context of 
copyright rules and notions of authorial autonomy.  Authorial autonomy in its two 
aspects—economic autonomy and personal autonomy—is foundational to copyright.  
However, where works derive from a nonmarket model of information production and 
are highly factual, intended to disseminate knowledge, and unmarketable as individual 
works, as is the case with most scholarly articles, the automatic grant does not unduly 
encroach upon authorial autonomy in either sense. 
¶104  Lastly, it bears mentioning that the discussion of the durability of permission 
mandate licenses is relevant to nonexclusive licenses in other contexts, as well.  This 
issue will only increase in importance, as the vast majority of online content is made 
available under express or implied nonexclusive licenses.  Does, for example, a 
nonexclusive Creative Commons license in the form of code embedded in a website or 
document constitute a signed writing for purposes of § 205(e), so that a user who relies 
on the license to distribute or adapt the content is not an unwitting infringer if the author 
of the preexisting work has transferred her copyright?  Given § 205(e)’s underlying 
concern that the writing provide evidence and notice of the nonexclusive license’s 
existence, it might make sense to find the license satisfies the writing requirement if the 
license is conspicuous or easily identified, even if the license does not take the form of a 
traditional signed written instrument.  More generally, however, it seems prudent now to 
evaluate the need to recalibrate current rules governing nonexclusive licenses, including 
§ 205(e), for today’s highly networked digital information environment. 
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